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H. L. A. HART’S LOST ESSAY:  
DISCRETION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS SCHOOL 
Geoffrey C. Shaw∗ 
This Essay analyzes an essay by H. L. A. Hart about discretion that has never before 
been published, and has often been considered lost.  Hart, one of the most significant 
legal philosophers of the twentieth century, wrote the essay at Harvard Law School in 
November 1956, shortly after he arrived as a visiting professor.  In the essay, Hart 
argued that discretion is a special mode of reasoned, constrained decisionmaking that 
occupies a middle ground between arbitrary choice and determinate rule application.  
Hart believed that discretion, soundly exercised, provides a principled way of coping 
with legal indeterminacy that is fully consistent with the rule of law.  This Essay 
situates Hart’s paper — Discretion — in historical and intellectual context, interprets its 
main arguments, and assesses its significance in jurisprudential history.  In the context 
of Hart’s work, Discretion is notable because it sketches a theory of legal reasoning in 
depth, with vivid examples.  In the context of jurisprudential history, Discretion is 
significant because it sheds new light on long-overlooked historical and theoretical 
connections between Hart’s work and the Legal Process School, the American 
jurisprudential movement dominant at Harvard during Hart’s year as a visiting 
professor.  Hart’s Discretion is part of our jurisprudential heritage, advancing our 
understanding of legal philosophy and its history. 
INTRODUCTION 
A few weeks before Thanksgiving, in 1956, H. L. A. Hart quietly 
gathered his thoughts as he watched “the most important public  
law thinkers”1 of the Legal Process School take their seats at a  
new Harvard faculty seminar, unsure of what to expect.  Hart was  
nervous.  The exacting Oxford philosopher, at ease in logic tuto- 
rials and language games, was a stranger to the confident world of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ In researching and writing this Essay, I benefited immensely from the exceptional help and 
guidance of many colleagues, friends, and mentors.  I am grateful to Margaret Peachy and Lesley 
Schoenfeld at the Harvard Law School Library and to Jennifer Thorp at the library at New Col-
lege, Oxford, for patient help with archival materials, to Joanna Ryan for giving permission for 
Discretion to be published, and to the Editors of the Harvard Law Review for thoughtful and 
precise editing.  My thanks go out to Rachel Bayefsky, Heather Cameron, Josh Chafetz, Michael 
Dorf, Julian Gewirtz, Ben Jackson, Nicola Lacey, James McAuley, Frank Prochaska, Ward Shaw, 
Steven B. Smith, Carol Steiker, and Justin Zaremby for reading earlier drafts of the manuscript 
and offering generous feedback, and to Alec Baum, Robert L. Byer, Timothy Endicott, William 
Eskridge, Erin Fitzgerald, Thomas Grey, Leslie Green, Mark Jia, Harvey Lederman, Kristen 
Rundle, and the participants in the Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group for very helpful 
thoughts on several key points.  I am most deeply indebted to Carol Steiker for invaluable help 
and guidance turning an idea into an Essay, and to Nicola Lacey, an inspiring teacher of jurispru-
dence, for her unwavering support at every stage of the project. 
 1 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Commentary, The Making of The Legal Pro-
cess, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2047 (1994).     
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“busy . . . proud . . . vocational”2 American law professors.  Though 
highly regarded as a brilliant legal theorist, he was far from uncontro-
versial.  And that evening, just two months into his year as a visiting 
professor at Harvard, Hart was going to lecture his new colleagues on 
a family of issues they cared deeply about: discretion, its place in the 
legal system, and the relationship between legal indeterminacy and the 
rule of law. 
For Hart, still getting his bearings at Harvard, giving a lecture on 
such a charged topic was a daunting prospect — especially given the 
“potentates”3 in his audience, which included Henry Hart,4 Albert 
Sacks, Herbert Wechsler, Paul Freund, and Lon Fuller — but also an 
opportunity to demystify his approach to legal scholarship.  The ana-
lytical jurisprudence Hart had developed at Oxford — which prized 
conceptual clarity, logical rigor, and the careful study of language in 
legal analysis — aroused suspicion among his new colleagues, who 
wondered whether he was a “radical positivist,” as one American 
scholar had suggested just months before.5  What could Hart’s new ju-
risprudence offer legal scholars in the United States, for whom the 
study of law often hinged not on precise formulations of abstract con-
cepts, but on insights into judicial behavior, institutional design, and 
social reality? 
Exceptionally well versed in the history of American legal thought, 
Hart understood the persistent significance of the issues he had been 
asked to address.6  In the nineteenth century, legal formalists had ar-
gued that legal questions have determinate answers that skilled law-




 2 Letter from H. L. A. Hart, Professor of Jurisprudence, Univ. of Oxford, to Jenifer Hart 
(Nov. 4, 1956) (on file with the New College Library, University of Oxford) (describing his talk on 
discretion).   
 3 Id.  
 4 Henry M. Hart, Jr., and H. L. A. Hart were two different people.  Henry Hart (1904–1969) 
was Dane Professor of Law at Harvard Law School; H. L. A. Hart (1907–1992) was Professor of 
Jurisprudence at Oxford.  Together with Lon Fuller (1902–1978), Paul Freund (1908–1992),  
Herbert Wechsler (1909–2000), and others, the Harts were part of a generational cohort of legal 
thinkers who came to prominence in the immediate postwar period, sharing many concerns and 
aspirations discussed throughout this Essay.   
 5 Edgar Bodenheimer, Modern Analytical Jurisprudence and the Limits of Its Usefulness, 104 
U. PA. L. REV. 1080, 1083 (1956).   
 6 This summary is a simplified explanation by way of introduction; it is certainly not intended 
as a comprehensive history of the idea of discretion, or of any school of thought in American  
jurisprudence.  
 7 See generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 9–65 (1995); 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 9–31 
(1992); Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 495–97 (1996) (re-
viewing DUXBURY, supra).   
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trast, the realists of the early twentieth century had argued that judges 
and officials in fact exercise tremendous power of choice.8  While real-
ists hoped that this power of choice could be deployed progressively to 
improve social conditions, they never developed a theory to direct or 
constrain choice in law.  Rule by arbitrary choice is not rule by law, 
and thus the lasting legacy of legal realism became a challenge: explain 
how legal indeterminacy can be reconciled with the rule of law. 
The problem of discretion became more pressing after the New 
Deal.  Increased complexity in law meant more decisions, more inde-
terminacy, and greater need for a theory of what to do when indeter-
minacy arose.  As they tried to figure out “how to have a dynamic, 
problem-solving government that [was] also lawlike and legitimate,”9 a 
group of post–New Deal professors, many of whom sat in Hart’s audi-
ence, developed a tentative solution to the realists’ challenge: discre-
tion is acceptable in the legal system if it is sufficiently constrained and 
responsibly exercised.  These “process theorists” accepted the realist 
idea that law is sometimes indeterminate, but pushed beyond realism, 
searching for a theory of how legal indeterminacy could be consistent 
with the rule of law.  For process theorists, discretion and the rule of 
law could coexist symbiotically if responsible judges decided cases ra-
tionally, observing their institutional position with respect to the other 
branches of government, and explained their reasoning in writing, re-
flecting the judiciary’s professional craft, rationality, and wisdom — 
things in which the public could place its trust.  Just two years before 
Hart’s arrival, the problem of discretion took on renewed, political ur-
gency as Brown v. Board of Education10 posed the sharper “counter-
majoritarian difficulty.”11 
When his audience settled, Hart delivered a plainspoken analysis of 
discretion as a phenomenon in life and law — conversational yet un-
compromising in philosophical precision.  As Hart saw it, discretion is 
a special form of constrained, reasoned decisionmaking based on ap-
peal to rational principles.  For Hart, true discretion exists when 
decisionmakers base their decisions on reason rather than on “whim” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2048.  See generally DUXBURY, supra note 7, at 65–
161; JUSTIN ZAREMBY, LEGAL REALISM AND AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming Dec. 2013).  See 
also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010) (a particularly nuanced account arguing against a clear formalist-
realist distinction); and WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVE-
MENT (1973).  
 9 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2047–48.  
 10 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 11 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 203 (2d ed. 1986); see 
also id. at 244–72; LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 5–6 
(1996) (commenting on how Brown changed the equation for law professors).  
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or “fancy.”12  Further, Hart argued that discretion is a necessary com-
ponent of any legal system, because society’s ability to regulate the fu-
ture is inherently limited by imperfect information and an imperfect 
understanding of aims.  As such, positive law will inevitably be partly 
indeterminate; there will necessarily be cases that require judges to 
“make” rather than merely to “find” law.  In these cases, Hart argued, 
decisionmakers must exercise discretion — the special form of 
decisionmaking he had just described.  Hart believed that indetermi-
nacy is fully compatible with the rule of law as long as the method 
used to resolve indeterminate cases comports with the rational stan-
dards that distinguish discretion from arbitrary choice.  For Hart, dis-
cretion was part of law, to be perfected, rather than an obstacle associ-
ated with the rule not of law but of men. 
The talk set off a “storm” among the professors — and Hart rel-
ished it.13  Predictably, the professors tore into his linguistic approach 
and questioned his analytic style, but when it came to the substantive 
analysis of discretion, their objections subsided.  Hart was proud of his 
performance, and he thought he had impressed his new colleagues.14  
A few weeks later, he consolidated his analysis and produced an essay, 
Discretion.15  Hart circulated his essay to the members of his audience, 
the newly formed “Legal Philosophy Discussion Group,”16 who read it, 
discussed it, and used it as a theoretical backdrop for subsequent dis-
cussions — discussions that forged the ideas for some of the most fa-
mous “legal process classics.”17  “The lines of inquiry” pursued in the 
group, Henry Hart wrote to Lon Fuller the next autumn, “are of the 
greatest consequence to Al [Sacks] and me as we set out on the last lap 
of our effort to complete our materials on ‘The Legal Process.’”18 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 H. L. A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652, 657 (2013) [hereinafter Hart, Discretion]. 
 13 See Letter from H. L. A. Hart to Jenifer Hart, supra note 2. 
 14 See id. 
 15 See Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 652 n.†. 
 16 For information about the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group, see NICOLA LACEY, A 
LIFE OF H. L. A. HART 188 (2004); Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and 
Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1, 51 (2013); and Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2047–49.  
 17 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2048.  For example, Lon Fuller presented a draft ver-
sion of his seminal article, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication.  Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).  This essay remained unpublished at the 
time of Fuller’s death, although it was widely read and circulated in draft form.  In a brief intro-
duction to the essay, Professor Kenneth I. Winston notes that it was first presented to the Legal 
Philosophy Discussion Group.  See Kenneth I. Winston, Special Editorial Note to Fuller, supra, at 
353, 353.  
 18 Letter from Henry Hart, Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., to Lon Fuller, Professor of 
Law, Harvard Law Sch. 3 (Nov. 5, 1957) (with copies to Al Sacks and John Dawson) (on file with 
the Harvard Law School Library, Papers of Lon L. Fuller, Box 4, Folder 2, and also preserved in 
the Papers of Henry M. Hart, Jr., Box 3, Folder 6) [hereinafter Nov. 5, 1957, Letter from Henry 
Hart to Lon Fuller].  
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Hart’s essay has never been published, and until now it has been 
almost entirely unknown.  It is not included in Hart’s archive, perhaps 
due to his “prodigious levels of disorganization.”19  Hart once “gestured 
to the piles of books and papers littering every surface of his 
room . . . and remarked to John Finnis: ‘This [i.e., the chaos] has con-
sumed a huge amount of my life.’”20  Fate intervened, however, and 
Freund and Henry Hart each kept their copies of Discretion in their 
files.  In time, those files became historical archives in the Harvard 
Law School Library, where I discovered H. L. A. Hart’s “lost” essay 
more than half a century after it was written.21 
A small group of scholars have known that Hart wrote an essay on 
discretion for the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group.  Professor  
Anthony Sebok read Hart’s manuscript and provided its greatest 
scholarly treatment to date, in a footnote in his book Legal Positivism 
in American Jurisprudence and in a short section of a separate article, 
insightfully analyzing some of the essay’s broadest themes on the way 
to discussions of different topics.22  The other scholars who have men-
tioned Discretion believed the essay had been lost completely.  Profes-
sors William Eskridge and Phillip Frickey refer to Hart’s paper in 
their introduction to the 1994 edition — and first official publica- 
tion — of (Henry) Hart and Sacks’s The Legal Process.  Eskridge and 
Frickey state that “H. L. A. Hart circulated his own paper on ‘Discre-
tion’”23 “very probably presenting a point of view willing to admit that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 LACEY, supra note 16, at 185.  
 20 Id. at 186 (alteration in original) (quoting Hart).  
 21 It is deceptively easy to miss, as it is signed only with Hart’s initials, H. L. A. H., and locat-
ed in the Henry Hart and Paul Freund collections — places one would not normally expect to 
find material about H. L. A. Hart.   
 22 See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 169 
n.232 (2008); and Anthony J. Sebok, Finding Wittgenstein at the Core of the Rule of Recognition, 
52 SMU L. REV. 75, 99–100 (1999), for the longest discussions of Hart’s lost essay already pub-
lished.  Sebok insightfully notes the resonance with process theory and the relationship between 
the two Harts, but discusses Hart’s Discretion only en route to other arguments.  This interpreta-
tion of Discretion complements and builds on Sebok’s brief discussion.    
 23 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. &  
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS, at ci (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994).  Eskridge and Frickey note that H. L. A. Hart’s paper was “to be discussed with  
Henry Hart’s paper.”  Id.  Although H. L. A. Hart’s and Henry Hart’s papers may have been dis-
cussed together in later sessions, H. L. A. Hart delivered his paper at the meeting before Henry 
Hart delivered his, giving Henry Hart a chance to draft his paper after hearing his English col-
league’s views.  H. L. A. Hart’s letter to the group on November 19 says that he delivered the pa-
per “last time,” Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 652 n.†, while Henry Hart delivered his paper 
on November 20, see Notes of Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., for a 
Talk on November 20, 1956 on The Place of Discretion in the Legal System (Nov. 20, 1956) (on 
file with the Harvard Law School Library, Papers of Henry M. Hart, Jr., Box 35, Folder 7) [here-
inafter Hart Notes on The Place of Discretion in the Legal System]. 
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much discretion could not be controlled by law.”24  An article by Pro-
fessor Michael Dorf makes reference to Hart’s “lost” essay and to the 
discussion group as part of an analysis of the philosophical foundations 
of the process movement.25  Professor Nicola Lacey, in her critically 
acclaimed biography of Hart, mentions Hart’s contribution to the dis-
cussion group and notes that he “provoked a stormy debate.”26  But 
Lacey was not aware that a copy of Discretion had survived.  The re-
mainder of the massive secondary literature on Hart and his legacy 
has ignored the essay completely. 
In my mind, Hart’s essay raises a wealth of important questions.  
To start, H. L. A. Hart is a jurisprudential giant — the central figure 
in the postwar revival of legal positivism in the English-speaking 
world.27  How has his essay on a subject as significant as discretion 
remained hidden for so long?  How did H. L. A. Hart wind up writing 
an essay for a faculty group at Harvard in the first place, and how did 
Hart’s interests relate to the concerns of his Harvard colleagues?  How 
does his analysis of discretion fit into the rest of his work?  Did it res-
onate with the views of his Harvard colleagues?  Did it influence their 
intellectual trajectory?  His?  Most importantly, what does Discretion 
reveal about the world in which it was written?  I believe that H. L. A. 
Hart’s lost essay provides a window into our jurisprudential past, il-
lustrating a critical moment in our intellectual history and advancing 
our understanding of theoretical problems of enduring importance.  
Making full sense of it requires both historical and philosophical  
context. 
* * * 
Discretion reveals a new dimension to Hart’s work: the essay pre-
sented a theory in lockstep with the key themes of the Legal Process 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 23, at ci.  Eskridge and Frickey mention the “Memorandum 
from H. L. A. Hart to the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group . . . circulating a paper on ‘Discre-
tion,’ but no copy included.”  Id. at ci n.215.  The copy was in the archive in September 2012, 
along with the memorandum.    
 25 Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 922 
n.179 (2003) (commenting on Eskridge and Frickey’s discussion of H. L. A. Hart’s contribution to 
the discussion group). 
 26 LACEY, supra note 16, at 188.  
 27 For Hart’s biography, see LACEY, supra note 16.  For information on Hart’s significance 
and legacy as a legal philosopher, see generally MICHAEL D. BAYLES, HART’S LEGAL PHILOS-
OPHY (1992); HART’S POSTSCRIPT (Jules L. Coleman ed., 2001); ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H. L. A. HART (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987); LAW, 
MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H. L. A. HART (P. M. S. Hacker & J. Raz 
eds., 1977); NEIL MACCORMICK, H. L. A. HART (1981); MICHAEL MARTIN, THE LEGAL PHI-
LOSOPHY OF H. L. A. HART: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (1987); and THE LEGACY OF H. L. A. 
HART: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Matthew H. Kramer et al. eds., 2008).  
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School.28  Reasoned elaboration, constraints on judicial decision-
making, and the recognition that law is a dynamic, multi-institutional 
enterprise all take center stage in Hart’s analysis.  Further, Hart’s un-
derstanding of the way indeterminacy relates to the rule of law reso-
nates strongly with process theory: indeterminacy is an inevitable, but 
perfectly acceptable, part of the legal system as long as it is resolved 
according to the appropriate method.  Most significantly, Discretion 
illustrates the extent to which H. L. A. Hart and the leading figures of 
the Process School shared a common moment in the history of ideas — 
institutionally, on the Harvard campus and in the Legal Philosophy 
Discussion Group in 1956–1957, and theoretically, as seekers of a mid-
dle road between formalism and realism. 
On occasion, scholars have identified a theoretical resonance be-
tween H. L. A. Hart’s analytical positivism, expressed elsewhere, and 
process theory, though the connection remains largely unexplored.  
Sebok draws attention to a connection between (Henry) Hart and 
Sacks’s account of legal authority and H. L. A. Hart’s idea of the rule 
of recognition — the master rule that identifies valid legal norms — 
claiming that the central picture of law in The Legal Process is basical-
ly positivistic.29  Dorf argues that H. L. A. Hart’s positivism “entails a 
view about the institutional allocation of power remarkably close to 
the one articulated by (Henry) Hart and Sacks in The Legal Process.”30  
More specifically, Dorf argues that (Henry) Hart and Sacks’s “principle 
of institutional settlement”31 — the idea “that decisions which are the 
duly arrived at result of duly established procedures . . . ought to be 
accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they are 
duly changed”32 — is a statement of legal positivism and represents 
“an effort to operationalize . . . the ‘rule of recognition.’”33  Professor 
Charles L. Barzun points out that (Henry) Hart and Sacks offered a 
picture of law’s basic origins — consisting of the need for one set of  
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 The Legal Process School was, of course, a somewhat amorphous group, and its member-
ship and theoretical precepts are difficult to pin down precisely.  This Essay does not attempt to 
problematize the Process School, but rather to draw attention to aspects of its history and context.     
 29 Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 2108–09 (1995).  
But see Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1155–60 (1999) 
(reviewing SEBOK, supra note 22) (agreeing with Professor Charles L. Barzun that process theory 
conflicted with legal positivism in important respects).  The purpose of this Essay is not to consid-
er the claim that (Henry) Hart and Sacks were legal positivists as a theoretical matter.  For more 
on the rule of recognition, see generally MACCORMICK, supra note 27, at 105–33. 
 30 Dorf, supra note 25, at 910.   
 31 Id. at 922 (emphasis omitted).  For background on the principle of institutional settlement, 
see Sebok, supra note 29, at 2106–07.  
 32 Dorf, supra note 25, at 922 (alteration in original) (quoting HART & SACKS, supra note 23, 
at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 33 Id.  
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substantive “understandings or arrangements” to guide “community 
life”34 and “another set” of second-order “arrangements . . . to clarify 
what the substantive arrangements require in particular instanc-
es; . . . to determine when one of the substantive arrangements has 
been violated; and . . . to make a change to the existing set of substan-
tive arrangements”35 — that is “strikingly similar” to H. L. A. Hart’s 
hierarchy of primary rules and secondary rules of adjudication, 
change, and recognition.36  On a final, intellectual-historical note, 
scholars have observed that process theory and analytical positivism 
were therefore both part of the broad “postwar liberal project,”37 seek-
ing an understanding of law that would bolster liberal values and dis-
tinguish liberal democracy from Nazism and fascism. 
Discretion, however, significantly expands our understanding of 
these connections — connections that remain poorly understood in 
part because of the strong, and widely recognized links between pro-
cess theory and the works of Fuller and Ronald Dworkin, theorists 
whom Hart argued against in celebrated debates.38 
At the same time, Discretion enhances our knowledge of Hart’s 
broader legal philosophy.  In the context of Hart’s work, the essay is 
unusual in two respects.  First, Hart emerges from Discretion as a the-
orist interested in law’s worldly functioning and the practical challeng-
es of adjudication — not just in conceptual clarity.  While many of 
Hart’s other writings are abstract and more purely philosophical, Dis- 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 34 Barzun, supra note 16, at 26.   
 35 Id. at 27.   
 36 Id. at 27 n.105.  Barzun says, however, that it is “deeply misleading” to take the characteri-
zation of process theory as positivistic too far.  See id. at 26.  Similarly, Eskridge and Frickey pre-
fer “rationalism” to “positivism” as a description of the process ethos, noting that process theory 
involves the “interconnected integrity of law and morals.”  See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 23, 
at lv tbl.1.  For information on Hart’s hierarchy of rules, see generally MACCORMICK, supra note 
27, at 92–120.   
 37 Anthony J. Sebok, Reading the Legal Process, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1575 (1996) (review-
ing HART & SACKS, supra note 23) (“The Legal Process represents a significant episode in the 
postwar liberal project associated with Robert Dahl and John Rawls.”); see also Edward A.  
Purcell, Jr., American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democrat-
ic Theory, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 424 (1969).  For a discussion of Hart’s liberalism, see LACEY, supra 
note 16, at 56–57, 221–22; H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals]; 
and Nicola Lacey, Philosophy, Political Morality, and History: Explaining the Enduring Reso-
nance of the Hart-Fuller Debate, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1069 (2008). 
 38 See Dorf, supra note 25, at 910.  For more information on the Hart-Fuller debate and its 
legacy, see generally THE HART-FULLER DEBATE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Peter 
Cane ed., 2010).  For more information on the Hart-Dworkin debate, see generally Scott J. 
Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed (Univ. of. Mich. L. Sch. 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 77, 2007).  For connections 
between Dworkin and the Process School, see generally Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the 
Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1987). 
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cretion is sensitive to law’s institutional form as well as its conceptual 
structure, sensitive to the challenges faced by officials interpreting le-
gal texts as well as the logical problems posed by words, and sensitive 
to the chaotic workings of the administrative state as well as the philo-
sophical nature of government and its authority.39  Lacey’s introducto-
ry Essay perceptively argues that these institutional lines of thought 
ultimately did not “engage Hart’s deepest interest.”40  Indeed, they all 
but disappeared from his work in later years.  In this light, Hart’s en-
gagement with questions of institutional form in Discretion brings the 
Process School’s influence on his thinking at Harvard into even sharp-
er focus. 
Second, Discretion sketched a theory of legal reasoning.  Hart’s  
later work pressed further into the conceptual structure of legal sys-
tems, the relationship between law and morality,41 and the theory of 
criminal law,42 but strangely, largely left this major theme of Discre-
tion behind.  Hart’s relative silence on legal reasoning is a shortcoming 
of his legacy — one that left him vulnerable to attack in his debates 
with Fuller and Dworkin, in which legal reasoning was a primary axis 
of controversy.  In fact, Hart regretted that The Concept of Law, his 
most famous book, skimmed over the topic so quickly: “I certainly 
wish to confess now that I said far too little . . . about the topic of ad-
judication and legal reasoning.”43  Scholars writing after Hart have re-
peatedly analyzed his theory of legal reasoning and the role of discre-
tion in judicial decisionmaking based on the comparatively light 
treatment the topics receive in his published work.44  Professor Gerald 
Postema, for example, perceptively observes that Hart believed that 
“deciding to apply a rule to an instance outside its settled core is often 
a matter of reasoned elaboration of the rule, drawing on diverse con-
siderations running through the law.”45  The ideas in Discretion are 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 Neil MacCormick’s “institutional theory of law” emerged partly in response to Hart’s lack 
of attention to institutional matters.  See NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW, at v 
(2007) (discussing Hart’s “unchallengeable” “place in history” despite his failure to address law’s 
institutional manifestation more fully).   
 40 Nicola Lacey, The Path Not Taken: H. L. A. Hart’s Harvard Essay on Discretion, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 636, 639 (2013).  
 41 See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963); H. L. A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW].   
 42 See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW (1968). 
 43 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 259.   
 44 See, e.g., BAYLES, supra note 27, at 174–81 (discussing judicial discretion in Hart’s philoso-
phy); MACCORMICK, supra note 39, at 121–32 (discussing “Judicial Discretion and the Judicial 
Role” in Hart’s philosophy); Roger A. Shiner, Hart on Judicial Discretion, 5 PROBLEMA 341 
(2011).   
 45 Gerald J. Postema, Positivism and the Separation of Realists from their Scepticism: Norma-
tive Guidance, the Rule of Law and Legal Reasoning, in THE HART-FULLER DEBATE IN THE  
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consistent with what little Hart did say on the subject in later years, 
but they are far more comprehensive.46  The essay fills a significant 
gap in Hart’s work. 
As Lacey’s introductory Essay argues, Hart may have shied away 
from legal reasoning in later work out of anxiety that his understand-
ing of it conflicted with his commitment to the rule of recognition as 
the ultimate criterion of legal validity, and with his commitment to the 
conceptual separation of law and morality.  Tensions arising from these 
conflicts flared up in the “Postscript,” where Hart recycled some of the 
arguments from Discretion in an abridged and less illuminating form.  
While Discretion may suggest why legal reasoning might have posed 
difficulties for Hart’s analytical positivism, it reveals, at the same time, 
arguments Hart envisioned to answer such concerns. 
In other ways, Discretion represents a missing link in Hart’s intel-
lectual development.  The essay was one of his first academic endeav-
ors in the year that proved to be the major “turning point” in his phil-
osophical life.47  “Ideas started pullulating at a rather alarming rate,” 
Hart reflected; “I thought, am I going mad? . . . I was getting so many 
different things inside.”48  At the end of his year at Harvard, in April 
1957, Hart delivered his Holmes Lecture, Positivism and the Separa-
tion of Law and Morals — a watershed event in the history of legal 
philosophy in which Hart expressed most of the key ideas that would 
be published five years later in The Concept of Law, “the most influen-
tial book in legal philosophy ever written in English.”49  The Holmes 
Lecture and The Concept of Law both drew from the ideas he ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 38, at 259, 264.  Postema offers an excellent analysis of 
Hart’s understanding of the judicial role, and the discovery of the Discretion paper bolsters many 
of Postema’s claims.  See id.   
 46 The Concept of Law and the “Postscript” advanced similar conclusions without much detail, 
as did the short introduction to Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, written in 1983, where 
Hart mentioned that the notion “that judges, when they reach a point at which the existing settled 
law fails to determine a decision either way, simply push aside their law-books and start to legis-
late de novo for the case in hand without further reference to the law . . . has never been my view” 
and briefly endorsed a form of reasoned, discretionary decisionmaking in response to indetermi-
nacy.  H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 1, 6–7 (1983) [hereinafter 
HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY].  Hart’s account of the judicial process 
here, however, used slightly more Dworkinian language than the account he provided in Discre-
tion, perhaps reflecting Dworkin’s influence on his later thinking.  In the introduction to the Es-
says in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Hart noted that “[v]ery often in deciding such [indetermi-
nate] cases courts cite some general principle or general aim or purpose which a considerable area 
of the existing law can be understood as exemplifying or advancing,” before rejecting the notion 
that this endeavor can render law fully determinate.  Id. at 7.  
 47 LACEY, supra note 16, at 179.  For a magnificent account of Hart’s year at Harvard, see id. 
at 179–208.  
 48 See id. at 190 (quoting Interview by Michael Brock and Brian Harrison with H. L. A. Hart 
(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49 Leslie Green, Preface to the Third Edition of HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 
41, at xl, xl.  
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pressed in Discretion in the fall of 1956.  In fact, Hart clearly had Dis-
cretion directly on hand when he drafted The Concept of Law: several 
passages from the essay appear nearly verbatim in the chapter ad-
dressed to “Formalism and Rule-Skepticism.”50 
Hart’s Discretion, therefore, is part of our jurisprudential heri- 
tage — part of the history of process theory, of analytical positivism, 
and of jurisprudence since.  The present Essay aims to make sense of 
Discretion — to revisit its context, analyze its arguments, and interpret 
its significance.  Part I situates the Legal Philosophy Discussion 
Group, and Hart’s participation, in historical and theoretical context, 
sketching a basic outline of process theory and illustrating Hart’s 
growing interest in American legal thought.  Part II analyzes the con-
tent of Hart’s essay, providing a sympathetic reconstruction and inter-
pretation of his ideas and drawing attention to connections between 
Hart’s analysis and the views of the process theorists.  While there will 
no doubt be other valid interpretations of Hart’s arguments, this Essay 
interprets Discretion in light of the Process School in an attempt to 
remain faithful to the historical circumstances of Discretion and the 
perspective of Hart’s audience.  Part III assesses the significance of the 
essay in light of other contributions to the discussion group and in 
light of the criticisms of Hart’s jurisprudence leveled by Fuller and 
Dworkin.  Discretion clarifies Hart’s positions and helps us interpret 
important aspects of subsequent jurisprudential history.  Accompany-
ing this Essay is Hart’s Discretion itself — finally in print for the first 
time. 
I.  SETTING THE SCENE: H. L. A. HART  
AND PROCESS THEORY PRE-1956 
A.  The Process Ethos 
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, a group of American professors 
developed a new approach to legal scholarship as an improvement on 
and replacement for legal realism.51  The new “process” approach 
aimed to capture the institutional reality of the post–New Deal admin-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 124–54.  In notes to the analysis be-
low, I try to indicate which passages from the Discretion paper found their way into The Concept 
of Law.   
 51 See generally DUXBURY, supra note 7, at 207–99; HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 247–68; 11 
GERALD J. POSTEMA, A TREATISE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND GENERAL JURISPRU-
DENCE (2011); Barzun, supra note 16; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1; Purcell, supra note 37; G. 
Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social 
Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973).  Although these and other scholars have sometimes drawn at-
tention to different aspects of process theory and therefore characterized the movement slightly 
differently, the major themes stand out in each account. 
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istrative state while placing central importance on antifascist, anti- 
communist values.  The New Deal called for a theory of law that 
could make sense of the complexity of regulatory government.52  Con-
currently, the specters of fascism in Germany and Italy and of com-
munism in the Soviet Union demanded a legal theory that reflected the 
values of a free society — a theory that showed how a complex admin-
istrative state could be “lawlike and legitimate.”53 
Simply stated, the new “[p]rocess theorists”54 directed their study to 
decisionmaking processes — the proliferation of which characterized 
post–New Deal government, the dismantling of which contributed to 
the consolidation of power in foreign dictatorships, and the integrity of 
which could anchor the concept of justice in a pluralistic society.  Pro-
cess theorists set out, first, to ask how legal decisions are made and 
which officials or institutions should make them, and second, to use 
the study of “comparative institutional analysis”55 to infer normative 
requirements binding legal officials.56 
1.  Purposive Law and the Fact-Value Distinction. — At the most 
basic level, process theorists understood government as a tool to solve 
society’s problems.  In The Legal Process, (Henry) Hart and Sacks 
characterized law as “a doing of something, a purposive activity, a con-
tinuous striving to solve the basic problems of social living.”57  The 
law, defined as a “purposive . . . activity”58 undertaken to solve the 
problems of community life, was conceptually inseparable from the 
goals and aspirations that motivated it.59 
The purposive approach to law was part of a broader intellectual 
trend toward an integration of fact and value.  At that time, as Barzun 
points out, intellectuals working “[i]n philosophy, the natural sciences,  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 52 White, supra note 51, at 280–86.  See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1.  Many  
of the process theorists, including Henry Hart, worked in or had close ties to the Roosevelt  
Administration.  
 53 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2048; see also id. at 2048–49.  For information on the 
foreign dimension, see generally HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 250–52; and Purcell, supra note 37. 
 54 Barzun, supra note 16, at 11.  
 55 Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the 
Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2123 (2003). 
 56 This is a simplified explanation.  I do not attempt to analyze the intellectual origins of pro-
cess theory in detail or to take a position in the debates surrounding the movement’s rise.  For 
excellent discussions, see DUXBURY, supra note 7, at 205–301; 11 POSTEMA, supra note 51;  
Barzun, supra note 16; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1; Purcell, supra note 37; Sebok, supra note 
29; and White, supra note 51.      
 57 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2042 (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. 
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 166 (tent. ed. 1958)) (internal quotation mark omitted).    
 58 See LON L. FULLER, LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 11 (1940) (“In the field of purposive hu-
man activity, which includes both steam engines and the law, value and being are not two differ-
ent things, but two aspects of an integral reality.”); HART & SACKS, supra note 23, at 166; 
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2042. 
 59 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2042–43.    
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and the social sciences . . . were beginning to question the possibility 
and profitability of rigidly separating questions of fact from questions 
of value.”60  Fuller had led the campaign to reunite facts and values in 
legal theory since the early 1940s starting with his book Law in Quest 
of Itself,61 in which he argued that it is impossible to define law, or to 
say anything adequate about it, without reference to its value-laden 
aims.  For Fuller, law is a “striving,” something teleological; what law 
is could not be understood except as something ever “in quest of it-
self”  — ever in quest, that is, of its very best self.  Henry Hart — with 
whom Fuller formed a “mutual admiration society”62 — picked up the 
same theme in 1951, remarking: “Law as it is is a continuous process 
of becoming.  If morality has a place in the ‘becoming,’ it has a place 
in the ‘is.’”63 
The purposive approach to law and the integration of fact and val-
ue lay at the core of the process theorists’ reaction to legal realism.  In 
their view, one of realism’s principal flaws was its insistence on the 
fact-value distinction.  Henry Hart’s 1963 Holmes Lectures,64 for ex-
ample, argued that the fact-value separation “would condemn any le-
gal theory to futility since we would not then be able to decide wheth-
er decisions were sound, who ought to make them, or what values they 
should reflect.”65  The lectures were, in Professor Philip Bobbitt’s 
words, Henry Hart’s “cri de coeur against legal realism.”66 
2.  Dynamic Institutionalism and Reasoned Elaboration. — Anoth-
er problem with realism was its failure to develop a theory that could 
direct and harmonize the actions of different organs of government.  
Process theorists aimed to make sense of the complexity of modern 
government by asking, in Professor Akhil Amar’s words, “who is, or 
ought, to make a given legal decision, and how that decision is, or 
ought, to be made.”67  Accordingly, process theorists developed a theo-
ry of institutional competence as they tried to determine how different  
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 60 Barzun, supra note 16, at 48.  
 61 FULLER, supra note 58; see also KRISTEN RUNDLE, FORMS LIBERATE: RECLAIMING 
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LON L. FULLER 28–32 (2012).   
 62 Dorf, supra note 25, at 921 (quoting Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 23, at lxxxiii) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Dorf goes on to suggest that Henry Hart drifted away from Fuller’s 
jurisprudential view in later years, moving closer to H. L. A. Hart’s positivism.   
 63 Henry M. Hart, Jr., Comment, Holmes’ Positivism: An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929, 
930 (1951). 
 64 Barzun notes that this lecture reiterated ideas in The Legal Process only “with some slight 
modifications.”  Barzun, supra note 16, at 18. 
 65 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 56 (1982).  
 66 Id.  
 67 Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 691 (1989) (reviewing PAUL  
M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL  
SYSTEM (1988)).  
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tasks should be allocated to different institutions.  “Legal scholars 
could examine courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, executives, 
juries, etc.,” Professor Guido Calabresi writes, “and shed light on the 
particular attributes of each of these that would make a given institu-
tion especially suited to decide some issues rather than others.”68 
Legislatures, agencies, and organs of the executive branch might be 
well suited, in terms of expertise and democratic mandate, to make 
policy determinations — but process theorists believed that courts are 
uniquely capable of resolving disputes in accord with reason and prin-
ciple.  This observation yielded a simple normative standard: judges 
should respect that some problems are best resolved by other institu-
tions, and settle the problems for which courts are indeed the appro-
priate forum according to a method that reflects courts’ special abili-
ties.  Judicial decisions should be rational, they should appeal to 
general principles rather than to policy preferences, and they should be 
faithfully explained in writing.  When legal rules fail to determine an 
outcome for a case, forcing a judge to “make” law, the judge should 
perform a “reasoned elaboration”69 of existing law, rationally extending 
it until the case is resolved. 
Further, because law is inherently purposive, reasoned elaboration 
requires an effort to further law’s goals — not just the general goals of 
the legal order as a whole, but also the specific goals of the individual 
laws in question.  As a corollary of their basic purposive stance, Hart 
and Sacks held that “every statute and every doctrine of unwritten law 
developed by the decisional process has some kind of purpose or objec-
tive, however difficult it may be on occasion to ascertain it or agree 
exactly how it should be phrased,”70 to imbue it with meaning.  Rea-
soned elaboration aims to clarify and vindicate such purposes. 
The theory of reasoned elaboration solved two problems: it justified 
the judicial function and constrained it.  The theory carved out a space 
for judges in the post–New Deal administrative state, providing a posi-
tive guide for the contribution of courts to the dynamic legal system as 
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 68 Calabresi, supra note 55, at 2123.  It is also worth noting that the concept of comparative 
competence appears on several levels within the process paradigm, revealing a recursive structure 
to the process-theoretic system of thought.  In the process weltanschauung, the comparative ad-
vantage of lawyers in a professional society (lawyers are skilled in designing and coordinating 
decisionmaking processes) and the comparative advantages of different jobs within the legal pro-
fession (professors are uniquely positioned to criticize the performance of courts) are important in 
addition to the comparative competence of different institutions within the legal process.  
 69 HART & SACKS, supra note 23, at 147 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 162–71.  
 70 Id. at 148.  It is important to note that Hart and Sacks seemed to have in mind a particular 
attitude toward purposes, the identification of which should not take place “in the mood of a cyn-
ical political observer, taking account of all the short-run currents of political expedience that 
swirl around any legislative session.  It should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, 
that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”  
Id. at 1378.   
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a whole.  Simultaneously, the theory ensured that the power of courts 
was limited by demanding that judges defer to other institutions where 
appropriate, and by insisting that judicial decisions be transparent, ra-
tional, and rooted in purpose.  As Professor Richard Fallon writes, 
“while the judicial role is irreducibly creative in some respects,  
it is limited to the reasoned elaboration of principles and policies  
that are ultimately traceable to more democratically legitimate 
decisionmakers.”71 
Set in post-realist context, the theory of reasoned elaboration was a 
significant accomplishment.  Process theorists could maintain that le-
gal indeterminacy poses little threat to the rule of law, as long as inde-
terminacy is resolved in the right manner.  Limited judicial lawmaking 
constrained by the obligation of reasoned elaboration is in fact part of 
the social and institutional equilibrium that results from the right insti-
tutions soundly carrying out the right tasks — part of the rule of law 
itself.72 
3.  The Golden Age. — Process theory “achieved consensus status 
after the war.”73  “Beginning in 1951, the Harvard Law Review initiat-
ed the practice of inviting legal scholars to write Forewords to its 
analysis of the Supreme Court’s work for the preceding term.”74  The 
Forewords reflected a collective effort to hold the Supreme Court to 
the standards of reasoned elaboration.  “Early Forewords decried the 
Vinson Court’s tendency to dispose of cases without giving any reasons 
at all,”75 and Sacks’s Foreword for the 1953 term expressed concern 
about the overuse of “per curiam opinions in which the reasons for the 
decision are either entirely omitted or set forth in a few sentences.”76  
In 1953, Henry Hart and Wechsler published one of the movement’s 
most “defining” casebooks, The Federal Courts and the Federal Sys-
tem.77  And throughout the 1950s, (Henry) Hart and Sacks continued 
to edit and refine the materials that would become The Legal Pro-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 71 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
953, 966 (1994).  
 72 As Professor Laura Kalman observes, “[o]nce the legal realists had questioned the existence 
of principled decision making, academic lawyers spent the rest of the twentieth century searching 
for criteria that would enable them to identify objectivity in judicial decisions.”  KALMAN, supra 
note 11, at 5.  
 73 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2049. 
 74 White, supra note 51, at 286. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Albert Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term — Foreword, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96, 99 (1954).  
Overall, “the authors of successive Forewords gradually expanded and sharpened the focus of 
their critique,” pursuing the “Reasoned Elaborationist” agenda with greater and greater clarity.  
White, supra note 51, at 286. 
 77 For an excellent history of Hart and Wechsler’s casebook and an insightful interpretation of 
its significance and “defining” place in process theory, see Amar, supra note 67.  
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cess,78 at that point still an assortment of educational materials  
first compiled before World War II.79  Process theory had reached its  
“golden age.”80 
Soon, however, process theorists found themselves racing to keep 
up with a changing political landscape.  After 1954, the question of 
how to understand Brown v. Board of Education loomed large.81  For 
legal theorists, the landmark decision called not just for a theory of 
how courts could contribute to “a dynamic, problem-solving govern-
ment that is also lawlike and legitimate,”82 but also for a theory of 
when and how courts could override electoral majorities in pursuit of 
substantive justice, effecting “policy change with nationwide impact”83 
to build a more inclusive democracy.  The Process School’s most sig-
nificant ideas — the purposive approach to law, institutional compe-
tence, and reasoned elaboration — had emerged as political change 
drew attention to realism’s shortcomings.  But now, political change 
was beginning to draw attention to process theory’s shortcomings.84  
The process theorists were strong supporters of civil rights, and they 
were committed to desegregation.85  By and large, they were political 
liberals.  But Brown suggested a much more potent role for courts 
than the process theorists had envisioned.  And even though the pro-
cess theorists likely agreed with Brown’s result, it was not clear if the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 78 For a meticulously researched and extremely illuminating documentary history of The Legal 
Process materials, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 23.  
 79 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2042.  
 80 Amar, supra note 67, at 691.     
 81 KALMAN, supra note 11, at 5–6 (commenting on how Brown became an urgent concern for 
law professors).  
 82 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2047–48.  
 83 KALMAN, supra note 11, at 2 (emphasis omitted).  
 84 According to Dorf, 
[Henry] Hart and Sacks assumed that the sorts of conflict that law was needed to re-
solve would occur principally along economic lines: management versus labor, producer 
versus consumer, and so forth.  When new lines of conflict emerged — most prominently 
in the form of the Civil Rights movement and successor rights movements — it became 
clear that deference to one or another existing institutional settlement would pit substan-
tive justice against the notion of a circumscribed judicial role.  Issues of racial inequality 
had, of course, been central to the entire American experience, but it was not until the 
Warren Court that the vindication of the fundamental rights of citizens (other than 
property rights) came to be understood as a basic function of courts.   
Dorf, supra note 25, at 930–31.  As Amar explains, “Brown called into question every central tenet 
of the legal process theory embodied in the first edition of The Federal Courts and the Federal 
System,” which was released a year before the Brown decision.  Amar, supra note 67, at 703.  And 
in Eskridge and Frickey’s words, “[t]he prominence of civil rights on the nation’s public law 
agenda unraveled the intellectual consensus achieved during World War II, and hence under-
mined important conceptual foundations of The Legal Process” — namely, the notion that even 
though citizens might harbor deep disagreements about questions of value, they might neverthe-
less agree about how to decide what to do in national politics.  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, 
at 2049.  
 85 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2050 n.114. 
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opinion’s superficially policy-oriented reasoning satisfied their de-
mands of institutional competence and reasoned elaboration.  The 
1958 version of The Legal Process did not even mention Brown a sin-
gle time; Hart and Sacks did not know what to say about it.86 
B.  The Arrival of H. L. A. Hart 
A few years earlier and an ocean away, H. L. A. Hart had em-
barked on a completely novel intellectual project at Oxford: combining 
the study of law with the latest form of analytic philosophy.  Hart 
started his career as a philosopher after World War II at a time when 
Oxford philosophy was abuzz with a new form of linguistic analysis.  
Under the vigorous leadership of J. L. Austin, Hart’s cohort of philos-
ophers aimed to clarify concepts by studying the ordinary usage of 
words.  Drawing on his prewar experience as a barrister, Hart saw the 
opportunity to make a distinct contribution to the movement by ana-
lyzing concepts in legal discourse: what is a right, or a duty, or an obli-
gation, or even “law” itself?  Hart explained a few years later that in 
legal philosophy, “it is particularly true that we may use, as Professor 
J. L. Austin said, ‘a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our 
awareness of the phenomena.’”87  In 1952, Hart became Professor of 
Jurisprudence — the first time a philosopher had assumed that posi-
tion — and devoted himself full time to his new style of linguistically 
informed analytic jurisprudence.88 
The process theorists were watching closely.  In the spring of 1955, 
Lon Fuller, the most philosophically minded of the process theorists, 
proposed that Harvard invite Hart to spend a year in Cambridge as a 
visiting professor.89  Harvard’s process-mania had spurred an interest 
in what other forms of legal theory might contribute to the process 
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 86 The relationship between process theory and the Warren Court’s race cases became an ex-
plosive issue by the end of the decade.  See generally LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
(1958); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1959).  Eskridge and Frickey note that Wechsler developed the ideas for Neutral Principles while 
participating in the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group.  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 
2048; see also WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION 458–59 
(The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise, History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Vol. 12, 
2006). 
 87 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, at vii (1961) (quoting J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses: The 
Presidential Address, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 8 (1957)).  Interestingly, Hart’s quota-
tion omitted a qualification in Austin’s original text, which read, “[W]e are using a sharpened 
awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenome-
na.”  Austin, supra, at 8.  Hart’s trimmed version suggests that he may have been even more bull-
ish than Austin on the power of linguistic analysis to elucidate reality. 
 88 For a detailed narrative of Hart’s career between 1945 and 1956, see LACEY, supra note 16, 
at 112–78.  
 89 Untitled Memorandum from Lon L. Fuller, Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch. (undated) 
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Papers of Lon L. Fuller, Box 3, Folder 14) [herein-
after Untitled Memorandum from Lon L. Fuller].    
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generation’s project,90 and although Hart’s form of linguistic analysis 
was “far from congenial”91 at Harvard, Fuller was eager to engage 
with it, recognizing — cautiously — that linguistic philosophy repre-
sented a significant advance over previous movements in the analytic 
tradition and could prove influential among American scholars.92  
Fuller equally envisioned Hart “taking back to England a real under-
standing of the currents of legal thought in this country.”93  Fuller 
hoped that Hart would become invested in American problems and di-
rect his philosophical powers to them. 
 1.  Hart’s Early Interest in American Legal Thought. — Hart eager-
ly accepted Harvard’s invitation.  His interest in the United States was 
already deepening.  Starting in the early 1950s, Hart nursed a growing 
fascination with American legal thought — an interest that led him to 
devour American jurisprudence, teach it at Oxford, and publish sever-
al articles in American journals.  He was sufficiently engaged with 
American intellectual life by the time he arrived at Harvard in the fall 
of 1956 that he was already established as a transatlantic legal figure. 
In fact, Hart had visited the United States once before, in 1952, 
when he attended a conference on “legal and political philosophy” just 
outside New York City.94  The conference’s short guest list included 
leading American legal and political figures.95  Presiding over the con-
ference was Dean Rusk, future U.S. Secretary of State and newly ap-
pointed President of the Rockefeller Foundation, which sponsored the 
conference.  It was the first occasion on which Hart encountered 
Fuller — whom he would meet many times again — as well as a 
number of other jurisprudential figures, including Edward Levi,  
Jerome Hall, and Hessel Yntema.  Following the conference, Yntema 
invited Hart to write an essay comparing postwar jurisprudence in 
Britain and America for The American Journal of Comparative Law, a 
new publication Yntema had founded the year before.96  The essay 
Hart wrote reflected his growing interest in the United States.97  He 
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 90 See LACEY, supra note 16, at 184.   
 91 Lacey, supra note 40, at 640.   
 92 See Untitled Memorandum from Lon L. Fuller, supra note 89. 
 93 Id. at 1. 
 94 See List of Addresses of the Participants in the First Conference on Legal and Political Phi-
losophy, Arden House, October 31 to November 3, 1952 (undated) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library, Papers of Lon L. Fuller, Box 3, Folder 5).  
 95 See id. 
 96 Yntema probably invited Hart to write the article at the conference or shortly thereafter.  
See generally Vera Bolgár, The American Journal of Comparative Law 1952–1966, 15 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 21, 24 (1967) (discussing Yntema’s role in founding the journal and the early years of 
his editorship); In Memoriam: Hessel E. Yntema, U. MICH. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Spring 
1966, at 7.  
 97 See H. L. A. Hart, Philosophy of Law and Jurisprudence in Britain (1945–1952), 2 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 355 (1953) [hereinafter Hart, Philosophy of Law and Jurisprudence].  
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compared the structure of the legal professions, the styles of legal edu-
cation, and the forms of thought that prevailed in the two countries, 
suggesting that analytic jurisprudence would be a permanent fixture of 
English legal thought, but at the same time implying clearly that 
American approaches were worthy of careful study.98 
Full of energy, Hart returned to England and launched an Ameri-
canization campaign.  To start, he began to modify the Oxford juris-
prudence curriculum to include more American writers, encouraging 
his students to read Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, Benjamin 
Cardozo, John Chipman Gray, and Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.99  Hart 
also shifted the emphasis of Oxford’s jurisprudence examinations to-
ward American thought.  Students sitting for their jurisprudence ex-
ams in 1953, the first year after Hart took the curricular reins, were 
invited to analyze a quotation from Pound about the function of eco-
nomics in law.100  Christopher Columbus Langdell appeared on the 
examination in 1954,101 and in 1955, students confronted questions like 
“What is sociological jurisprudence?”102 and “Is a right merely the cor-
relative of a duty?,”103 a question referring to Hohfeld, an American 
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 98 See id. 
 99 See id. at 358.  This inference is drawn from the difference between the list of recommended 
reading appearing in Hart’s article and Oxford’s official reading list.  What is noteworthy about 
Hart’s list is that it reproduced exactly the official list of recommended reading in the Oxford Ex-
amination Statutes, but added four American texts — a revision that reflects Hart’s growing in-
terest in American thought and his belief that American writers were of jurisprudential signifi-
cance even for Oxford undergraduates.  See AW BRIAN SIMPSON, REFLECTIONS ON THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 53–54 (2011).  
 100 Oxford Univ. Honour Sch. of Jurisprudence, 1953 Trinity Term Examination Paper q.11 (on 
file with the Bodleian Law Library, University of Oxford).  Compare with the pre-Hart exams: In 
1949, students were asked: “To what extent is the Court of Appeal bound by precedents?”  Oxford 
Univ. Honour Sch. of Jurisprudence, 1949 Trinity Term Examination Paper q.2 (on file with the 
Bodleian Law Library, University of Oxford).  Students sitting for their final exams in 1950 were 
invited to comment on specific quotations from Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, and were 
asked general questions making direct reference to Austin’s theories, such as “Do you regard en-
forcement as an essential element in the definition of law?”  Oxford Univ. Honour Sch. of Juris-
prudence, 1950 Trinity Term Examination Paper q.4 (on file with the Bodleian Law Library, Uni-
versity of Oxford).  In 1951, students were asked to comment on a quotation from Sir Thomas 
Holland, a prominent nineteenth- and early twentieth-century English jurist, Oxford Univ. Hon-
our Sch. of Jurisprudence, 1951 Trinity Term Examination Paper q.8 (on file with the Bodleian 
Law Library, University of Oxford), and in 1952, students were invited to compare Bentham’s 
utilitarian theory with the historical approach, Oxford Univ. Honour Sch. of Jurisprudence, 1952 
Trinity Term Examination Paper q.10 (on file with the Bodleian Law Library, University of  
Oxford).   
 101 Oxford Univ. Honour Sch. of Jurisprudence, 1954 Trinity Term Examination Paper q.6 (on 
file with the Bodleian Law Library, University of Oxford). 
 102 Oxford Univ. Honour Sch. of Jurisprudence, 1955 Trinity Term Examination Paper q.7 (on 
file with the Bodleian Law Library, University of Oxford). 
 103 Id. at q.5. 
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theorist in whom Hart was particularly interested.104  The 1956 exam 
asked whether “the pith and substance of American realist jurispru-
dence” could “be conveniently stated in a short paragraph” and invit-
ed students to “[e]stimate the importance of this jurisprudential  
approach.”105 
2.  Hart’s Early Critique of Realism. — As Hart was asking his 
students to “estimate the importance” of the realist “approach,” he was 
developing a critique of realism himself.  Hart’s inaugural lecture, de-
livered to mark the beginning of his tenure as Professor and later pub-
lished as Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,106 revealed the early 
stages of antirealist thought that would find mature expression in 
Hart’s later work.107  In his inaugural lecture, Hart did not launch an 
exhaustive attack on realism, but he did object immediately to the re-
alists’ prediction theory of law: the view that law is nothing more than 
a prediction of what officials will do.  For Hart, abstract legal concepts 
should be defined with reference to the ordinary meaning of the terms 
used to denote them, not with reference to a future state of affairs.108  
Pressing further, the essay he wrote for Yntema the next year proposed 
a counterexample to the prediction theory: In England, he observed, 
courts are less powerful than they are in the United States; English 
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 104 Hart developed an early interest in Hohfeld, who deployed a form of analysis to investigate 
the function of law in practice that would have appealed to Hart’s linguistic sensibilities.  Al-
though they disagreed on many points, Hart found in Hohfeld a forerunner to his own linguisti-
cally focused analytical jurisprudence.  Hart’s inaugural lecture lauded parts of Hohfeld’s theory 
of corporations (a theory expressed “with a requisite degree of subtlety,” Hart said), though ulti-
mately disagreeing with it, and praised Hohfeld for his attention to linguistic detail.  H. L. A. 
Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70  LAW Q. REV. 37, 54 (1954) [hereinafter Hart, 
Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence], reprinted in HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 46, at 21, 41.  Hart devoted two lengthy footnotes in his inaugural lec-
ture to discussion of Hohfeld’s work, explaining and charitably extending Hohfeld’s theories, be-
fore ultimately expressing his disagreement.  Id. at 35 n.15, 42 n.22.  Hart’s interest in Hohfeld 
would grow: in an essay published a few years later, he mentioned Hohfeld no fewer than five 
times, frequently mentioning him, alongside John Austin and the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen, as 
one of his principal forerunners in the analytic tradition.  H. L. A. Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence 
in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor Bodenheimer, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 956–57, 
959, 970 (1957) [hereinafter Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence].    
 105 Oxford Univ. Honour Sch. of Jurisprudence, 1956 Trinity Term Examination Paper q.7 (on 
file with the Bodleian Law Library, University of Oxford). 
 106 Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, supra note 104.  
 107 See, e.g., HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 121–50.   
 108 How, he asked, would a realist define a “right”?  “[T]he American Realists,” Hart wrote, 
“striving to give us an answer in terms of plain fact tell us that a right is a term by which we de-
scribe the prophecies we make of the probable behaviour of courts or officials.”  Hart, Definition 
and Theory in Jurisprudence, supra note 104, at 39.  Hart immediately recognized this as an im-
plausible way to define a legal term.  Id.  Hart’s footnote at this point went to Walter Wheeler 
Cook, but Hart was referring to a general view that dates back to Holmes.  Id. at 39 n.3.  In gen-
eral, Hart held a caricatured view of American legal realism.  See generally E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., 
H. L. A. Hart’s Concept of Law in the Perspective of American Legal Realism, 35 MOD. L. REV. 
606 (1972), for more on how Hart distorted the realists’ approach.  
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courts are responsible only for a small portion of the law, and even for 
that small portion they do not have the final say.  How then, Hart 
asked, could law itself — not just American law — be defined as the 
prediction of what courts will do?  “There are, I think, no ‘legal real-
ists’ in England in the American sense of these words,” Hart wrote.109  
“For important as the courts are, they have never appeared so im-
portant or so free in their operation as to make plausible the conten-
tion that law is merely a prediction of what the courts will do . . . .”110  
Realism, in Hart’s assessment, partly grew out of a collective Ameri-
can obsession with the judiciary. 
Although Hart rejected the definitional foundations of realism, he 
was more sympathetic to the realists’ view of legal reasoning.  “[T]he 
American Realist theories,” he wrote, “have much to tell us of value 
about the judicial process and how small a part deduction from prede-
termined premises may play in it.”111  Hart agreed with the realists’ 
claim that judges sometimes “make” rather than merely “find” law, and 
he admired realism’s critique of formalism and “mechanical jurispru-
dence.”112  In 1953, Hart admonished legal scholars to “emancipate 
themselves finally from the notion that deductive proof exhausts the 
notion of reasoning which has inspired both dogmatic obscurity and 
sceptical extravagance in the past.”113 
Most importantly, though, Hart found fault with the realists for 
failing to separate their insights into adjudication from definitional 
claims about the nature of law.  This theme would return strongly in 
Discretion, as Hart assessed the consequences of purposive analysis in 
legal reasoning.114  In Hart’s estimation, the realists were too quick to 
leap from the existence of judicial choice to the prediction theory of 
law.  Realism painted an important picture of judicial behavior, Hart 
wrote, but “the lesson is blurred when it is presented as a matter of 
definition of ‘law.’”115  In other words, Hart saw an important differ-
ence between an epistemic theory of legal reasoning and an ontological 
theory of law — a distinction he thought the realists had overlooked. 
Clear distinctions mattered to Hart.  His guiding belief was that 
analytic philosophy — proceeding with careful distinctions, logical rig-
or, linguistic analysis, and a rigid fact-value separation — could ad-
vance the study of jurisprudence by “elucidat[ing]” concepts” in legal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 109 Hart, Philosophy of Law and Jurisprudence, supra note 97, at 362.  
 110 Id.  This insight into the relationship between institutional arrangements and legal philoso-
phy offers a faint glimpse into Hart’s “path not taken,” foreshadowing the institutional analysis 
that reappeared in Discretion but receded from Hart’s mature work. 
 111 Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, supra note 104, at 40.   
 112 See id. 
 113 Hart, Philosophy of Law and Jurisprudence, supra note 97, at 364.   
 114 See, e.g., Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 665.  
 115 HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 46, at 25.   
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life, revealing the structures of power in society, and laying bare the 
moral choices citizens must make.116  Hart’s hope was that the analyt-
ic method could make good on Jeremy Bentham’s aspiration to “pluck 
the mask of Mystery from the face of Jurisprudence.”117  In tempera-
ment, therefore, Hart was sympathetic to realism’s demystifying aims.  
He respected iconoclasm.  He admired Bentham over Blackstone, 
Llewellyn over Langdell.118  But Hart demanded a level of philosophi-
cal rigor that realism, in his assessment, lacked. 
3.  Hart’s Newfound Trajectory. — Not surprisingly, it was Hart’s 
philosophical methodology that set him most at odds with his Ameri-
can contemporaries in advance of his year at Harvard.  Hart’s analyti-
cal approach conflicted with prevailing American approaches to legal 
scholarship (including process theory), which preferred institutional to 
conceptual analysis and insisted on a fact-value fusion.  This tension 
flared up three months before Hart arrived at Harvard when Edgar 
Bodenheimer, an American professor sympathetic to, though not di-
rectly part of, the Process School, sharply criticized Hart’s focus on 
analytical, as opposed to sociological, jurisprudence, arguing that 
Hart’s philosophical approach was of little value to education or theo-
ry.119  For Bodenheimer, Hart’s analytical jurisprudence constituted an 
endorsement of legal formalism — the outdated, conservative ancien 
regime of American legal thought.120  He declared that Hart “does not 
advocate going outside the boundaries of pure legal reasoning, appar-
ently believing that law is a self-contained science.”121  At the same 
time, Bodenheimer described Hart as a “radical positivist,”122 a sting-
ing critique in postwar America.  Positivism was anathema to postwar 
scholars partly because it involved the fact-value distinction, and all of 
its problems, and also because it called back to legal realism, and all of 
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 116 For Hart, the conceptual separation between law and morality was not just an element of 
philosophical methodology.  It was also a precept aiming at a liberal ideal.  “[His] implication 
[was] that things will turn out better, in terms of resistance to tyranny, if citizens understand that 
there are always two separate questions to be confronted: [F]irst, is this a valid rule of law? Sec-
ond, should it be obeyed?”  LACEY, supra note 16, at 198–99.  
 117 JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON 
GOVERNMENT 410 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., 1977). 
 118 For this apt alliteration, see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 68 (1977).  
 119 See Bodenheimer, supra note 5, at 1085.   
 120 See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 29, at 2068–72 (discussing associations between analytical juris-
prudence, classical positivism, and formalism).  Hart’s American readers may have believed there 
was a connection between “conceptual analysis” and “conceptualism,” a term linked with legal 
formalism.  See, e.g., id. at 2071. 
 121 Bodenheimer, supra note 5, at 1080.  The connection established an implicit link between 
Hart’s jurisprudence and the laissez-faire classical liberalism of the formalist era — an association 
that would have been particularly troubling for Hart, a left-leaning liberal.  See DUXBURY, supra 
note 7, at 9–64 (discussing the connections between formalism and laissez-faire liberalism).   
 122 Bodenheimer, supra note 5, at 1083.  
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its problems.123  Positivism amounted to a rejection of the post-realist 
understanding of law as a “purposive activity” undertaken to realize 
social goals, and an endorsement of the realist understanding of law as 
power.  Hart himself understood the taboo against positivism all too 
well: “The word ‘positivist’ had a tremendously evil ring [at Har-
vard],” Hart recalled.124  “I remember hearing somebody say, ‘You 
know he’s a positivist, but he’s quite a nice man.’”125 
Hart believed — correctly — that Bodenheimer had plainly mis-
read his work.126  But Bodenheimer’s critique is important in two re-
spects.  First, it helps to reveal how Hart’s new jurisprudence was be-
ing received in America in advance of his arrival.  It did not go over 
well: Hart’s approach looked like the devil and the deep blue sea.  On 
the one hand, “analytical jurisprudence” and Hart’s emphasis on “con-
ceptual analysis” harkened back to the worst of legal formalism.  On 
the other hand, by insisting on a separation of fact from value, Hart 
called to mind the worst of valueless legal realism and invited criticism 
rooted in the pejorative connotations of “positivism.”  Second, 
Bodenheimer’s critique influenced Hart’s intellectual trajectory.  In re-
sponse, Hart grew determined to clarify his ideas and more firmly dis-
tinguish his position from formalism and realism.  Bodenheimer’s ac-
cusation that Hart was everything the Legal Process School was not 
had the ironic effect of pushing Hart’s agenda into striking harmony 
with process theory.  The critique, Hart wrote, “stirred me from dog-
matic slumbers.”127 
Perhaps because the web of connotations was so fraught, Hart re-
turned repeatedly during his year at Harvard to the task of clarifying 
the true relationship between positivism, formalism, and realism.  In 
his Holmes Lecture, delivered at the end of his visit, Hart would re-
claim the moniker “positivism,” distinguish it from both formalism and 
realism, and defend the fact-value separation as an element of liberal 
legal thought.128  It was a synthetic statement of his jurisprudence that 
would bring him lasting fame.  But at the beginning of his year at 
Harvard, Hart was just starting to refine these ideas.  When he board-
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 123 Sebok, supra note 29, at 2095–99 (commenting on associations between realism and positiv-
ism in the postwar period).  
 124 David Sugarman, Hart Interviewed: H. L. A. Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman, 
32 J.L. & SOC’Y 267, 279 (2005).  
 125 Id.  
 126 Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence, supra note 104, at 953.     
 127 Id. (referring obviously to IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA: TO ANY FUTURE META-
PHYSICS THAT CAN QUALIFY AS A SCIENCE 7 (Paul Carus trans., Open Court Publ’g Co. 
1988) (1783) (“I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing, which many 
years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field of specu-
lative philosophy quite a new direction.”)).  
 128 See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, supra note 37. 
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ed the Queen Elizabeth in September of 1956 and set sail for the Unit-
ed States,129 he was embarking on an intellectual odyssey, searching 
for a philosophically rigorous middle way between formalism and real-
ism — extremes he would later call the “Scylla and Charybdis”130 of 
American legal thought.  He shared with process theory a common 
project.  Hart and the process theorists were charting similar courses 
through the same intellectual history.131  Both dismissed legal formal-
ism as hopelessly outdated and plainly false.  Both rejected the theo-
retical foundations of legal realism while accepting indeterminacy and 
remaining sympathetic to the project of progressive reform.  And most 
importantly, both faced moments of reckoning.  Hart’s jurisprudence 
required fresh articulation in light of American misunderstandings.  
And process theory — still holding “consensus status”132 — needed to 
“com[e] to grips with . . . Brown v. Board of Education.”133 
C.  The Legal Philosophy Discussion Group 
Thus, H. L. A. Hart arrived at Harvard at a moment of peculiar 
intellectual intensity — a moment when the process movement was 
near the apex of its “golden age”134 yet simultaneously shaken by the 
legal upheaval of the fifties, and a moment when Hart himself was be-
ginning to find his voice.  The year that followed would be an annus 
mirabilis in the history of legal theory.  (Henry) Hart and Sacks neared 
completion of the final “tentative” edition of The Legal Process materi-
als.135  Fuller presented the first draft of his classic article The Forms 
and Limits of Adjudication,136 which was widely read but formally 
unpublished until after his death.  Wechsler developed the key ideas 
that he would later publish as Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law,137 an article that would become famous — perhaps infa-
mous — for setting process theory at odds with the Court’s reasoning 
in Brown.  This was also the year when H. L. A. Hart “developed or 
laid the foundations for the vast majority of his work over the next 
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 129 LACEY, supra note 16, at 179. 
 130 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 147.   
 131 It is important to remember, as Lacey (in her introductory Essay) points out, that Hart drew 
his “primary [philosophical] resources” from English empiricist philosophy.  Lacey, supra note 40, 
at 639.  By the same token, the process theorists were engaging with a wide variety of American 
philosophical theories, notably pragmatism and contemporary social theory.  See generally  
Barzun, supra note 16 (examining the intellectual foundations of The Legal Process materials).  
Still, Hart and the process theorists found themselves with similar projects in 1956.   
 132 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2049. 
 133 Amar, supra note 67, at 703.  
 134 Id. at 691. 
 135 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2048.    
 136 Fuller, supra note 17.  
 137 Wechsler, supra note 86.  Eskridge and Frickey note that Wechlser formulated his key ideas 
for that article at Harvard in 1956–1957.  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2047–48.   
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decade.”138  In the spring, Hart delivered his famous Holmes Lecture, 
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, provoking a re-
sponse from Fuller and kicking off the storied Hart-Fuller debate.139  
The Harvard Law School Bulletin declared 1956–1957 “Harvard’s Ju-
risprudence Year.”140  By one professor’s count, the faculty offered six 
different legal philosophy courses for students.141  Perhaps most im-
portantly, a new faculty seminar — the Legal Philosophy Discussion 
Group — became a critical forum for the development of process theo-
ry and analytical positivism alike. 
Near the beginning of the fall semester, Freund, Fuller, and Henry 
Hart wrote to a few of their friends on the faculty to organize a faculty 
discussion group to address issues in legal philosophy.142  The trio 
“constituted themselves as an organizing committee” and reported  
that they had “coopted”143 a small group, including Professors John  
Dawson, Carl Friedrich, and Morton White, and the three visiting Pro-
fessors, H. L. A. Hart, Julius Stone,144 and Wechsler, “to serve as fel-
low charter members” — the “founding fathers” of the group.145  The 
“founding fathers” agreed to meet every two weeks at the Signet Socie-
ty for dinner and discussion, and while they hoped other professors 
would participate, they decided that the invitation to the rest of the 
faculty “will be phrased in such terms as to discourage anything like a 
unanimous response.  In particular, those who join will be asked to as-
sume a serious commitment to become regular attendants at the meet-
ings.”146  They decided to devote the year’s discussion to “a single gen-
eral topic”: “Administrative and Judicial Discretion.”147 
A few days later, on October 3, 1956, the “founding fathers” an-
nounced the group to the entire faculty, citing the opportunity to learn 
from H. L. A. Hart and the other visiting professors as a principal mo-
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 138 LACEY, supra note 16, at 190. 
 139 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630 (1958).   
 140 Samuel S. Shuman, Harvard’s Jurisprudence Year, HARV. L. SCH. BULL., Apr. 1957, at 8.  
Shuman lists seven seminars total, but one — the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group — was only 
for faculty.  Id. at 18. 
 141 Id.   
 142 Memorandum from Paul Freund, Henry Hart, and Lon Fuller, Professors of Law, Harvard 
Law Sch., to the “Law School Discussion Group” 1 (undated) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library, Papers of Henry M. Hart, Jr., Box 35, Folder 7) [hereinafter Undated Memoran-
dum to the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group]. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Stone and H. L. A. Hart had a difficult relationship at Harvard.  For more, see LACEY, su-
pra note 16, at 189–90 (describing Hart’s uneasy relationship with Stone); and LEONIE STAR, 
JULIUS STONE 158–62 (1992). 
 145 Undated Memorandum to the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group, supra note 142, at 1. 
 146 Id.  
 147 Id.  
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tivation for the group’s formation.148  “As you know,” they wrote, “we 
are fortunate in having as visitors this year a number of scholars dis-
tinguished in jurisprudence and related subjects. . . . [W]e should take 
advantage of the opportunity thus presented by organizing a group for 
the discussion of problems of legal philosophy.”149  Besides the nine 
“founding fathers,” at least twenty professors joined: Professors Robert 
Braucher, Kingman Brewster, Ernest Brown, David Cavers, Abram 
Chayes, Archibald Cox, Charles Fairman, Charles Haar, David 
Herwitz, Mark DeWolf Howe, Louis Jaffe, Benjamin Kaplan, Milton 
Katz, Robert Keeton, Louis Loss, John McNaughton, Albert Sacks, 
Samuel Shuman, Donald Trautman, and Donald Turner.150  Professors 
Erwin Griswold, Livingston Hall, and Stanley Surrey expressed inter-
est but missed the first meeting.151 
The organizers set out to construct an agenda for the year by  
determining “what special aspect of the problem of judicial and ad-
ministrative discretion [was] of the greatest personal interest” to each 
participant.152  In the memorandum framing the first discussion, the 
organizers seemed particularly interested in how diverse forms of dis-
cretion are related to each other conceptually and functionally.  “It 
may be suggested,” they noted: 
that the problem of “discretion” and its counterpart, “the rule of law,” as-
sume very different aspects depending upon: 
 (1) the form of law, say, code law v. common law; 
 (2) the area of law, say, commercial law v. criminal law; 
 (3) the governmental function involved, say, adjudication of a dispute by 
a court of equity v. . . . equity receivership; and 
 (4) whether the agency of government is charged with perfecting a mar-
ket . . . or laying down the rules for a regime of bargaining . . . on the 
one hand, or, on the other, supplanting a market . . . or taking over 
some of the functions of a market . . . .153 
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 148 Letter to the Members of the Law Faculty 1 (Oct. 3, 1956) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library, Papers of Henry M. Hart, Jr., Box 35, Folder 7).  Again, the organizers reiterated 
that the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group was intended to be a serious academic commitment: 
“We are asking that those who join the group enter a firm commitment to subscribe to a kind of 
season ticket and to undertake whatever preparation may be required to permit them to partici-
pate actively in the discussions.”  Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Memorandum to the Members of the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group 1 (Oct. 8, 1956) 
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Papers of Henry M. Hart, Jr., Box 35, Folder 7) 
[hereinafter Oct. 8, 1956, Memorandum to the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group]. 
 151 Id.  This brought the total membership to as high as thirty-two — and not surprisingly for 
1956, all of them men.  
 152 Id.  
 153 Id.  
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This initial memorandum, setting the tone for the year, offers sev-
eral insights about the group and its members’ interests.  To start, it 
was clear that the organizers were captivated with economics — in 
particular, with how the regulatory state could partner with the invisi-
ble hand of the market to realize social goals, revealing in process the-
ory an economic strand of Cold War liberalism.154  It was also clear 
that the group took law’s diversity seriously.  They set out to investi-
gate the workings of the whole legal system, looking beyond appellate 
adjudication to explore discretion in disparate parts of the law (for ex-
ample, in administrative decisions and criminal sentencing as well as 
in statutory and constitutional interpretation).155  The group’s mem-
bership was particularly suited to this cross-functional study: in Henry 
Hart the group had an expert on legislation and statutory interpreta-
tion; in H. L. A. Hart and Fuller they had experts in general jurispru-
dence; and in Wechsler and Freund they had experts in constitutional 
adjudication.156  The organizers hoped to synthesize different genres of 
legal scholarship to produce a comprehensive understanding of discre-
tion.  The memorandum further reveals that the group envisioned a 
connection between the “government function involved” and the way 
discretion is exercised,157 gesturing to the well-established concept of 
institutional competence.  Finally, the organizers posed “the problem of 
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 154 Many process theorists were alumni of the Roosevelt Administration and believed in the 
power of well-regulated but basically free markets as the path to growth and as a component of a 
free society.  The initial reading packet of “hastily selected materials” that were “intended simply 
to serve as pump-priming” for the group’s first, organizational meeting, id., which would not fea-
ture an introductory talk from one of the participants, included Planning and the Rule of Law, an 
essay that originally appeared as chapter six of Friedrich A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, and 
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the Civil and Common Law Systems, taken from a series of lectures Hayek had given the previous 
year entitled The Political Ideal and the Rule of Law.  See  id. at 2–9.  For connections between 
economic theory and jurisprudence in this period, see generally POSTEMA, supra note 51, at  
153–203.  
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cussion Group, supra note 150, at 9–18.  Another, On the Individuation of the Criminal Law, 
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Karl Llewellyn’s essay (translated from Llewellyn’s original German), When Does the ‘Applica-
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at 21.  The final reading was an excerpt from Pound’s Justice According to Law.  See id. at 21–22. 
 156 Eskridge and Frickey observe: “These authors were centrally concerned with the control of 
discretion — Hart and Sacks at the retail level of statutory and common law interpretation, 
Wechsler at the wholesale level of constitutional law, and Fuller at the meta-level of jurispru-
dence.”  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2048.  
 157 Oct. 8, 1956, Memorandum to the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group, supra note 150, at 1. 
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‘discretion’” and “the rule of law” as “counterpart[s].”158  In their view, 
a satisfactory solution to the problem of discretion was important to 
the conceptual integrity of the rule of law.  This statement of the 
group’s task reflected the group’s post-realist, post-Brown intellectual 
position.  Perhaps taking similar observations as his cue, H. L. A. Hart 
pursued each of these themes in his Discretion paper a few weeks  
later.159 
The group’s meetings turned out to be enormously popular.  As one 
participant reported in the Harvard Law School Bulletin, the meetings 
officially adjourned at 10:30 PM, but on occasion “the [Signet] Club 
steward has [reportedly] had to threaten to shut off the heat in order to 
compel some of the more perseverant discussants to abandon the 
cause.”160  Throughout the year, a range of professors led the group’s 
discussions, presenting papers on a number of related topics.  The 
group discussed papers by Henry Hart, Julius Stone, Jack Dawson, 
Kingman Brewster and Donald Turner, Herbert Wechsler, Carl  
Friedrich, and Louis Jaffe.161  The task of kicking off the year’s dis-
cussions with the first paper, though, fell to H. L. A. Hart.  Methodo-
logical suspicion aside, the group wanted to learn what Hart’s linguis-
tic philosophy could contribute to their project.  “Behind all of these 
questions is, of course, the more fundamental one of the power of 
words, or of concepts expressed in words, to direct and control human 
action,” the organizers wrote.162  “In this aspect the problem becomes 
one of philosophy . . . .”163 
II.  H. L. A. HART’S ACCOUNT OF DISCRETION 
At his talk, Hart distributed a three-page outline of his remarks, 
and then circulated the complete typewritten paper a few weeks later, 
on November 19 — “practically verbatim what I said last time,” he 
noted,164 though clearly revised and reworked in the aftermath of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 158 Id. 
 159 Hart’s attention to market economics — for example, his attention to Interstate Commerce 
Commission rate-fixing — is particularly unusual in the context of his more abstract other work.  
Further, Hart’s claim that human beings, and therefore lawmakers, inevitably operate with im-
perfect information, as discussed below, resonates with aspects of Hayek’s thought.   
 160 Shuman, supra note 140, at 18.   
 161 See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., Memorandum to the Legal 
Philosophy Discussion Group (Apr. 23, 1957) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Pa-
pers of Paul A. Freund, Box 155, Folder 5) (announcing Jaffe’s paper, Bureaucratic Discretion: 
Current Dilemmas); Memorandum to the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group Announcing the 
Next Meeting on March 19, 1957 (undated) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Papers 
of Paul A. Freund, Box 155, Folder 5) (announcing Friedrich’s paper).   
 162 Oct. 8, 1956, Memorandum to the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group, supra note 150, at 1. 
 163 Id.  The memorandum adds “and psychology,” id., reflecting the view (pioneered by the  
realists) that psychology had much to offer the study of judicial behavior.  
 164 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 652 n.† (emphasis omitted).  
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group’s meeting to clarify points that were met with confusion.  Alt-
hough he noted that his paper was somewhat unpolished — “so fugi-
tive a piece does not deserve so durable a form,” he wrote165 — it was 
carefully thought out and formally written, reflecting his strong inter-
est in the subject and his respect for his audience.  “Paper-preparing” 
for Discretion, he wrote to his wife, “took some time.”166  Although 
Discretion was in some respects a rehearsal for parts of his later, pub-
lished work,167 the essay presented vivid examples, detailed explana-
tions of ideas he would mention only in passing in other writings,  
and ideas that, in the context of his broader work, mark uncharted  
territory. 
A.  Clarifying Fundamental Questions 
In the wake of Bodenheimer’s criticism — and in light of the gen-
eral air of suspicion about the value of Hart’s analytic method — Hart 
wanted to demonstrate that conceptual analysis was useful to juris-
prudence, not a theoretical straitjacket.168  Discretion, seen this way, 
was intended as an example for the American academy of how the an-
alytical approach to definition and the “elucidation” of concepts could 
be profitably employed. 
Discretion began by specifying the five questions Hart believed 
were most important to bring forward, questions he thought had been 
lurking behind the group’s discussion without being stated clearly.  “I 
have the conviction that if we could only say clearly what the ques-
tions are, the answers to them might not appear so elusive,” Hart 
wrote.169  He believed that clarity in questions leads to clarity in an-
swers.  Hart’s questions indicated his attention both to conceptual 
structure and to social reality, reflecting the unique blend of “analytical 
jurisprudence” and “descriptive sociology” that would reappear in The 
Concept of Law.170  Hart’s questions also revealed his attention to in-
stitutional design, a theme largely absent from his later work. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 165 Id. 
 166 Letter from H. L. A. Hart to Jenifer Hart, supra note 2.   
 167 See, for example, HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 272, where he expresses 
his “picture of the law as in part indeterminate or incomplete and of the judge as filling the gaps 
by exercising a limited law-creating discretion.”  
 168 It is worth noting that this meeting may have been the first occasion on which many of the 
group’s members met Hart or heard any of his ideas directly from him.  Their preconceptions 
about “analytical jurisprudence” would likely have been at the front of Hart’s mind as he pre-
pared his paper.    
 169 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 652.  
 170 In the preface to The Concept of Law, Hart wrote that his book was simultaneously “an es-
say in analytical jurisprudence” and “an essay in descriptive sociology.”  HART, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW, supra note 41, at v.   
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Most importantly, Hart insisted on investigating what discretion is 
separately from investigating where discretion should fit into the legal 
system.171  Therefore, he led with an abstract, descriptive question 
about discretion’s conceptual nature: “What is discretion, or what is 
the exercise of discretion?”172  Only then did Hart move on to ques-
tions of the place and function of discretion in a legal system — sug-
gesting a more normative agenda concerning the proper place of dis-
cretion in law.  To start: “Under what conditions and why do we in 
fact accept or tolerate discretion in a legal system?”173  Then he turned 
to discretion’s necessity and relation to the broader values of a legal 
system: “Must we accept discretion or tolerate discretion, and if so, 
why?”174  “What values does the use of discretion menace, and what 
values does it maintain or promote?”175  And finally, “What can be 
done to maximize the beneficial operation of the use of discretion and 
to minimize any harm that it does?”176  Satisfied that he had framed 
his questions clearly, Hart began to provide answers. 
Hart’s argument in Discretion, reflecting the structure of his ques-
tions, was part descriptive and part normative.  First, he explored the 
question “What is discretion . . . ?” as a matter of descriptive concep-
tual analysis.  Discretion, he argued, is a form of decisionmaking that 
occupies an “intermediate place between choices dictated by purely 
personal or momentary whim” on the one hand, and the determinate 
application of clear rules on the other.177  Discretion is a special form 
of reasoned decisionmaking that entails constraints on the possible 
courses of action that the decisionmaker may choose to take.  In the 
second part of his essay, Hart moved into more normative territory, 
making an argument about the proper role of discretion in the legal 
system.  For Hart, legal systems inherently contain spheres of indeter-
minacy.178  There are inevitably gaps in the law, and officials making 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 171 Hart specifically excluded psychological questions from his discussion (noting that they had 
been raised by Freund), citing his belief that:  
[I]f we clearly understand what it is to exercise a discretion and what in different fields 
counts as the satisfactory exercise of a discretion, we shall not really have to face an in-
dependent psychological question of the form: what are the psychological conditions of 
its sound exercise or how are we psychologically able to exercise a discretion?   
Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 653.  Hart further believed that focusing on the psychological 
aspects of discretion would conceal the fundamental philosophical questions in need of resolution: 
“I think this question, which looks on the surface to be one of empirical psychology, perhaps really 
expresses in a rather misleading form just our initial unclarity about what discretion is and what 
in various fields we count as a sound exercise of discretion.”  Id.  
 172 Id. at 652.  
 173 Id.  
 174 Id.  
 175 Id.  
 176 Id.  
 177 Id. at 658.  
 178 Id. at 661–64. 
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decisions have to fill those gaps.  When they do so, Hart argued, legal 
officials ought to exercise discretion rather than arbitrary choice or 
whim.179  Resolved with sound discretion, as opposed to fiat, indeter-
minacy is fully consistent with the rule of law. 
B.  What Is Discretion? 
1.  The Analytical Approach to Definition. — Hart devoted a large 
portion of his paper to the first question: “What is discretion . . . ?”  It 
was a classic application of Hart’s linguistic method.  He believed that 
providing an account of a concept requires analyzing the way ordinary 
speakers use the words associated with that concept.180  To analyze 
discretion, therefore, Hart investigated the uses of the word “discre-
tion” in a variety of different contexts — legal and nonlegal — and 
then inferred the general principles at play.181  While Hart was aware 
that there were borderline cases — penumbral situations that might or 
might not be classified as discretion — he mainly aimed to contribute 
a clear theory of the core phenomenon: when we all agree discretion is 
present, what is it?182  A clear definition of the core phenomenon was, 
in Hart’s view, what the group needed most: “[t]he position” of the 
group with respect to discretion, Hart speculated, was “parallel to a 
person who knows his way about town by rote but could not draw a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 179 Id. at 663–64. 
 180 For information on the relationship between Hart’s analytical jurisprudence and linguistic 
philosophy, see MACCORMICK, supra note 27, at 12–19.  As noted above, Hart himself wrote that 
in jurisprudence “it is particularly true that we may use, as Professor J. L. Austin said, ‘a sharp-
ened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of the phenomena.’”  HART, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW, supra note 41, at v.  Indeed, in order to answer the question “What is discretion . . . ?,” 
Hart followed the analytical method that he had acquired from Austin and the Oxford circle of 
analytic philosophy.  There will no doubt be some debate, however, about whether Hart’s descrip-
tions of ordinary usage are in fact correct.    
 181 Hart believed that there will be meaningful similarities.  “It might of course be the case that 
the term discretion is hopelessly vague and used by courts and juristic writers in an entirely hap-
hazard fashion,” Hart admitted.  Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 653.  But: 
[I]f this were the case, the only observation which we could make about the meaning of 
the term discretion would be just this [that it is “hopelessly vague”].  But it seems to me 
very unlikely that this is in fact the case: if it were the case, we must agree to discuss 
discretion without any expectation that we should in fact be talking about a common 
subject.  What is likely to be the case, as in all the major notions involved in the law, is 
that we can find a set of characteristics which are found together in the standard case of 
discretion: that is, in cases where everyone would agree that we have the phenomenon of 
discretion . . . .   
Id.  In other words, Hart believed that even though discretion arises in different forms in a num-
ber of different legal contexts — “rate fixing by the [Interstate Commerce Commission], the grant 
or refusal of specific performance by a court, the exercise of reprieve or pardon by the execu- 
tive” — there is a core phenomenon common to every situation.  See id.   
 182 Id. at 654. 
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map of it or the crude case where we can say that I can recognize an 
elephant but I could not define the term ‘elephant’ for you.”183 
2.  Hart’s Taxonomy of Discretion in Law. — Hart began his analy-
sis of the core phenomenon by considering a broad list of cases where 
discretion occurs in the legal system.  Hart was not concerned with 
discretion in courts alone; he was aware that discretion arises not just 
in statutory or constitutional interpretation, but also in many other set-
tings.  Although it would become clear that the role of judges was of 
special concern for Hart (as it was for the process theorists), he warned 
against focusing too much on one kind of example at the outset, advis-
ing the group “to remind ourselves of the tremendous diversity of the 
situations in which this phenomenon appears, for nothing in this field 
is so misleading as over-concentration on one sort of example.”184 
The main distinction in Hart’s taxonomy of discretion in law was 
simple.185  Sometimes, lawmakers explicitly delegate discretionary 
power to officials or institutions — the powers, say, to set interest 
rates, to end hunting season, to appoint officials, to issue licenses, and 
so on.  In Hart’s terminology, these are examples of “Express or 
Avowed . . . Discretion.”186  By contrast, in cases of “Tacit or Con-
cealed Discretion,”187 the legal system does not explicitly grant discre-
tionary authority to an official; instead, the official, making an effort to 
apply rules intended to be as dispositive as possible, finds that the 
rules do not yield a determinate result, making necessary the exercise 
of discretion.  Key examples in this category are “disputable ques-
tions”188 in statutory interpretation and the application of precedent.189  
A third category, which received no further discussion, includes cases 
of “Discretionary Interference or Dispensation from Acknowledged 
Rules”: pardons and “[i]njunction[s] against exercise of common law 
remedies.”190 
Hart further noted that institutions are sometimes charged with ex-
ercising multiple forms of discretion.  “Express or Avowed . . . Dis-
cretion,” for example, can be exercised by “administrative bodies” 
(Hart identified the now-defunct Interstate Commerce Commission 
and “Fish and Game Commissioners” as possibilities), or by courts in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 655.   
 185 See id. at 655–56. 
 186 Id. at 655. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 656. 
 189 Id.  This distinction reappeared exactly in The Concept of Law, but without the terminology.  
See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 128–33.  In addition, Sebok notes that 
Hart’s distinction “parallel[s] the distinction between continuing and noncontinuing discretion in 
The Legal Process.”  SEBOK, supra note 22, at 169 n.232.  
 190 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 655.  
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the cases of sentencing, “[d]iscretionary remedies,” and the application 
of standards, like “reasonable care,” so broad as to be understood as 
constituting an explicit grant of discretionary authority.191  Delving 
deeper into institutional roles, Hart pointed out that this form of 
standard-applying discretion is entrusted sometimes to judges, and 
sometimes to juries.192  Hart classified most appellate adjudication in 
“disputable . . . case[s]”193 — the most politically charged form of 
decisionmaking on the list — as “Tacit or Concealed . . . Discretion” 
exercised by courts.194 
3.  Looking Beyond the Law: Discretion as a Middle Position. — 
Having categorized the legal examples of discretion, Hart turned to 
examples beyond the law for a more definitive clarification of the core 
phenomenon.  “In attempting to define or elucidate this term, we must 
for the moment avert our gaze from the Law,” Hart said, “because we 
shall find that the phenomenon of discretion which worries us in the 
Law has its roots and important place in our ordinary life.”195  So 
what is discretion in ordinary life?  And how do nonlegal uses of the 
term affect our understanding of discretion in legal contexts?  The full 
contour of Hart’s account began to take shape at this stage in the 
analysis, as he set out simultaneously to distinguish discretion from 
raw choice and from determinate rule application.  This way of situat-
ing discretion stood in exact analytical parallel to the intellectual goal 
he shared with the process theorists: finding a rationally stable middle 
road between realism (associated with “whim”) and formalism (associ-
ated with determinate rule application). 
(a)  Distinguishing Discretion from Arbitrary Choice. — It was 
immediately apparent to Hart that “discretion” denotes something dif-
ferent from arbitrary choice.  Although he was speaking in abstract 
terms, this distinction constitutes a tacit rejection of legal realism and 
its (sometimes-caricatured) account of judicial decisionmaking.  As 
Hart put it, discretion is not present in “cases where in choosing we 
merely indulge our personal immediate whim or desire.”196  Far from 
denoting the whimsical exercise of choice, “discretion is . . . the name 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 191 Id.  The discussion of the due care standard reappeared in The Concept of Law.  See HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 132–33.   
 192 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 655.  
 193 Id. at 656.  
 194 It is unclear where some forms of discretion would fit in Hart’s taxonomy.  For example, 
prosecutorial discretion (which he ignored) could be considered “Express or Avowed” because of 
the prosecutor’s legal right to decide which cases to bring.  Or it could be considered “Tacit or 
Concealed” because, faced with limited resources, prosecutors must make choices and cannot take 
up every case.  Or it could sometimes count as “Dispensation from Acknowledged Rules” for po-
tential defendants.  Or perhaps prosecutorial discretion presents a mix of all three.   
 195 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 656.  
 196 Id. at 657.   
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of an intellectual virtue: it is a near-synonym for practical wisdom or 
sagacity or prudence; it is the power of discerning or distinguishing 
what in various fields is appropriate to be done and etymologically 
connected with the notion of discerning.”197  “Hence,” he said, “we 
speak of years of discretion meaning not merely the age at which a 
human being is able to choose (because we can choose long before this) 
but merely the age when the judgment or discernment to be exercised 
in choice is ripe.”198  “A discreet person,” he continued, “is not someone 
who just remains silent but who chooses to be silent when silence is 
called for.”199 
To illustrate, Hart asked his audience to confront a dilemma that 
weighed heavily on the legal process generation: “Will you have a mar-
tini or a sherry?”200  Specifically, how would you defend your choice 
from criticism?  “You choose a martini, and I ask why,” Hart sup-
posed; “you reply, ‘Because I like it better — that’s all.’”201  This 
choice, for Hart, is not an exercise of discretion: “[T]he chooser accepts 
no principle as justifying his choice: he is not attempting to do some-
thing which he would represent as wise or sound or something giving 
effect to a principle deserving of rational approval and does not invite 
criticism of it by any such standards.”202  A choice, he argued, counts 
as an exercise of discretion only if it invites a reasoned defense ground-
ed in principles “deserving of rational approval.”203  Of course, if the 
person who chooses the martini can in fact offer a rational defense, 
Hart conceded that it might be a discretionary decision after all.204 
(b)  Distinguishing Discretion from the Determinate Application of 
Rules. — Having distinguished discretion from raw choice, Hart’s next 
step was to distinguish discretion from another decisionmaking ex-
treme: the determinate application of rules, whereby judges (and other 
officials, if appropriate) simply apply rules mechanically in a way that 
provides a correct answer in every case.  When “the principles are 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 197 Id. at 656. 
 198 Id. at 656–57. 
 199 Id. at 657. 
 200 Id.  This example and the examples that follow provide an amusing picture of the concerns 
of the Mad Men–era academic elite and reflect Hart’s keen sense of humor.  The examples might 
suggest that this group of law professors was worryingly disconnected from the social reality to 
which their legal theories would eventually apply.  But from another perspective, the examples 
reveal something important about Hart's intellectual style — his belief that the careful analysis of 
ordinary events can focus our attention and shed light on precepts of extraordinary social and po-
litical importance.   
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id.  Hart offered the parallel example of voting in an election: if a choice is justified ac-
cording to rational principles, as opposed to personal whim, then the decision may qualify as  
discretionary.  Id.  
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clear, determinate, highly specific, and uniquely determine the particu-
lar thing we have to do,” Hart said, “we do not classify [the resulting 
choices] as cases of discretion and it would be confusing to do so.”205  
Although Hart was describing an abstract mode of decisionmaking,  
his audience would have understood him as rejecting the (again,  
sometimes-caricatured) formalist idea that the law is a determinate, 
deductive science. 
To illustrate, Hart invited his audience to consider yet another puz-
zling predicament: sharpening a pencil.  “I go to the drawer and I am 
faced with a knife, three spoons, and two forks.”206  In the end, “I 
choose a knife: if asked why, I would not here reply, ‘Because I like it,’ 
but perhaps, ‘Because I want to sharpen a pencil and this is the obvi-
ous way to do it.’”207  In this case, Hart suggested, there is a correct 
answer.208  And where there is a correct answer, the word “discretion” 
seems out of place.209  “[I]t seems to me absurd to speak of a choice of 
a knife as an exercise of discretion,” Hart said; “it was the only sensible 
thing to do.”210  Hart generalized from the example to conclude: 
“[W]hen our aims are as determinate as this and the situation is as 
clear as this and the proper thing to do is patent to the elementary 
knowledge of what will produce what, we choose indeed correctly but 
not in the exercise of discretion.”211 
Consider as another example an American ritual that may have 
caught Hart by surprise: 
“The Star Spangled Banner” is played: I stand up.  “Why did you stand 
up?”  I reply not indeed by saying, “Because I wanted to,” but I cite the 
established rule which quite unambiguously specifies what I am to do in 
this particular case.  Here I have done the correct thing: I have made the 
right choice, but it would be misleading to describe [the choice] as the ex-
ercise of a discretion.212 
On Hart’s analysis, if the answer is clear from the start, and there 
is no plausible way the decision could go differently consistent with 
the rules being applied, the decision does not involve discretion. 
(c)  A Middle Road Between Arbitrary Choice and Determinate 
Rules. — Once he had situated discretion in the “intermediate” space 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 205 Id. at 658.  
 206 Id. 
 207 Id.  Perhaps Hart was unaware that specially designed pencil sharpeners have been avail-
able since at least 1837.  See Antique Small Pencil Sharpeners: 1837–1921, EARLY OFF. MUSE-
UM, http://www.officemuseum.com/sharpener_small.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).   
 208 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 658.  
 209 Id. 
 210 Id.  
 211 Id.  
 212 Id.  
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between arbitrary choice and determinate rule application,213 Hart 
drew out his understanding further with a more sophisticated example 
designed to reveal the general principles of discretion, which are pres-
ent in legal and nonlegal situations.214  He imagined that: 
A young hostess is giving her first dinner party and the question arises, 
shall she use for this occasion the best knives: they are old silver, very 
beautiful, and they will set off the snowy tablecloth and the glasses.  On 
the other hand, they are undoubtedly heavy and somewhat difficult to 
handle: they are not a bit sharp, and also their splendour might be thought 
a little bit showy by some.215 
In broad strokes, the hostess’s aims are clear: “[A] pretty dinner ta-
ble, admiration, but also the comfort of the guests and perhaps that of 
an old distinguished judge with somewhat shaky hands who is going 
to the party.”216  Faced with these aims and trade-offs, “the hostess 
ponders, she thinks out the possible disasters and some possible good 
consequences from the courses before her: she balances one considera-
tion against another and perhaps wonders whom she can consult.”217  
In turn, “[s]he asks someone who has had a lot of experience in this 
field, an old lady, who says sagaciously that ‘on the whole I think the 
wisest thing to do would be to use the second-best set.’”218  Important-
ly, the old lady “can give reasons for this such as the danger of discom-
forting old Mr. X. and his unfortunate behaviour when some small 
thing sets off his temper: she reminds the hostess of the possible jeal-
ousy of the younger guests, and so on.”219 
The travails of the young hostess demonstrate six features of discre-
tion that, for Hart, constitute the core of the phenomenon.220  First, 
there is no “clear right” decision.221  Second, “[t]here is not a clear de-
finable aim” at a helpful level of specificity,222 though some outcomes, 
including “the discomfort of the guests” and the “ugly appearance of 
the table,”223 may be obviously bad.  Third, the exact consequences of 
each possible decision are not clear.224  Fourth, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 213 Id.  
 214 See id. at 658–60.  
 215 Id. at 659.  Hart’s example again harkens back to the social mores of the 1950s, when 
sharpening pencils, selecting cocktails, and advising hostesses were apparently all the rage.  
 216 Id. 
 217 Id.  
 218 Id.  
 219 Id.  
 220 Id. at 659–60.  
 221 Id. at 659.   
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id.  Hart distinguished this case from the case of the pencil sharpener, where there was a 
“high probabilit[y]” that a knife would in fact do the job.  Id. 
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 [w]ithin the vaguely defined aim of a successful dinner party, there are 
distinguishable constituent values or elements (beauty of the table, comfort 
of the guests, etc.) but there are no clear principles or rules determining 
the relative importance of these constituent values or, where they conflict, 
how compromise should be made between them.225 
Fifth, words like “wise” and “sound” make more sense to describe dis-
cretionary decisions than do words like “right” or “wrong.”226  Sixth, 
Hart believed that discretionary decisions are defended in two different 
ways if they are called into question: justification and vindication.227  
As a justification, the hostess could defend her decision by appealing 
to her “honest attempt to give effect to such controlling principles or 
values as applied to the case and to strike impartially some compro-
mise between them where they conflicted.”228  The justification of a 
discretionary decision, in other words, involves a re-creation of the 
process through which the decision is made, and an appeal to the rea-
sons that influence the decision.229  Beyond this justificatory mode of 
defense, Hart pointed out that “the hostess might well appeal to the ac-
tual success of the dinner party” — a form of “vindication by re-
sults.”230  Hart was careful to point out, however, that a decision can 
be justified even if it happens to produce bad results.231  The 
decisionmaker will live and learn.232 
C.  The Proper Place of Discretion in Law 
Hart’s account of discretion so far had much in common with pro-
cess theory’s notion of reasoned elaboration: Hart believed that discre-
tionary decisions are rooted in reason and founded on “principle[s] de-
serving of rational approval,”233 and that a defense of a discretionary 
decision involves a reconstruction of the reasoning process that pro-
duced it.234  The second part of Hart’s essay addressed the conse-
quences of discretion in the legal system, asking why we should accept 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. at 660. 
 227 Id.  
 228 Id.  If the hostess’s decision were challenged,  
[s]he would point out how her decision had been reached: that it had been preceded by 
as careful a consideration of the constituent elements in a successful dinner party as she 
could give; that she had attempted to work out what would happen on either course; 
that she had thought of similar cases in her own experience and that she had obtained 
the advice of an experienced person.   
Id. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at 657. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. at 660. 
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it and how it can be consistent with the rule of law.235  Hart argued 
that discretion is the appropriate way of resolving cases with no clear 
answer — precisely the virtue that allows such inevitable interstices to 
be ruled by law instead of whim.236 
1.  The Inevitability of Indeterminacy in the Legal System. — Hart 
believed that indeterminacy is inevitable in law — an essential part of 
the project of prospective lawmaking.237  Why?  “[B]ecause we are men 
not gods . . . .”238  Our ability to regulate the future is inherently lim-
ited: “[A]s part of the human predicament,” Hart said, we operate un-
der “two handicaps.”239  First, Hart believed that lawmakers can never 
know everything about the future world they are trying to regulate: 
the lawmaking enterprise is constrained by what he called a “Relative 
Ignorance of Fact.”240  Second, even if we did live in a world of perfect 
information, Hart believed that the vagueness inherent in human aims 
would still preclude perfect prospective lawmaking: the second “handi-
cap” is a “Relative Indeterminacy of Aim.”241  In sum, lawmakers craft 
legal rules without knowing everything about the future and in pursuit 
of aims that are multifaceted and not perfectly determinate.242  Inde-
terminacy is the inevitable result.243 
Hart illustrated these handicaps with an example that would be-
come “the most famous hypothetical in the common law world”244: the 
rule “[n]o vehicles are to be taken into the park.”245  In fact, it was in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 235 See id. at 661–65. 
 236 See id. 
 237 See id. at 661. 
 238 Id.  The remark about being “men not gods” appeared verbatim in The Concept of Law.  
See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 128 (“[T]he necessity for such choice is 
thrust upon us because we are men, not gods.”).    
 239 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 661.  Again note that this distinction appeared in The 
Concept of Law with very similar language, but without the categorical terms “Express or 
Avowed” or “Tacit or Concealed.”  See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 128–29.   
 240 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 661.  Compare id. at 661–62 (“If the world in which we 
have to act and choose . . . consisted of a finite number of features or characteristics,” and “the 
modes in which these features could combine were limited to a finite number of these modes,” and 
“we knew both these features and modes of combination exhaustively, then we could always know 
in advance all the possible circumstances in which a question of the application of a rule would 
arise and we could therefore in framing our rule specify exhaustively in advance all the cases to 
which it was to apply and those to which it was not.”), with HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, su-
pra note 41, at 128 (“If the world in which we live were characterized only by a finite number of 
features, and these together with all the modes in which they could combine were known to us, 
then provision could be made in advance for every possibility.”).  It seems clear that Hart used the 
Discretion paper as a model for this section of the later book.      
 241 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 661. 
 242 Id. at 661–63. 
 243 See id. 
 244 Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 1109 
(2008).   
 245 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 662. 
 704 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 127:666 
Discretion that this example made its debut in Hart’s work.  The ex-
ample would feature prominently in Hart’s Holmes Lecture the next 
April,246 in The Concept of Law,247 and in much jurisprudential schol-
arship since.248  In Discretion, Hart’s analysis of “[n]o vehicles in the 
park” is familiar.249  There are some clear applications of the rule, en-
visioned when the rule was formulated  — “the motor car, the horse 
and cart, the motor bicycle, and the bus” — and some penumbral cases 
in which the application is unclear — “skates, bicycles, perambulators, 
and toy motor cars.”250  The aims of the rule against vehicles in the 
park are clear enough when cars and buses — cases foreseen — are 
involved: “[W]e know that we want peace in the park . . . .”251  But 
when it comes to cases unforeseen — “the scooter, the toy motor car 
electrically propelled” (which Hart observed was “perhaps rather fast, 
moderately dangerous to the old, but great fun for the young”) — “our 
aim is indeterminate,” because “we have not settled whether some and 
if so what degree of peace in the park is to be sacrificed to those whose 
interest or pleasure it is to use these objects.”252  The “Relative Inde-
terminacy of Aim” is therefore fused in Hart’s analysis with the “Rela-
tive Ignorance of Fact.”253 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 246 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, supra note 37, at 607–11.  
 247 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 125–26.  
 248 See Schauer, supra note 244, at 1111–12, 1111 n.10.   
 249 In his Holmes Lecture, Hart would deploy the example mainly to demonstrate the inherent 
vagueness of legal language, which also produced legal indeterminacy.  See Hart, Positivism and 
the Separation of Law and Morals, supra note 37, at 607.  Interestingly, Hart did not rely on the 
argument for indeterminacy from language vagueness in Discretion.  Rather, Hart used the ex-
ample to illustrate the idea that rules are indeterminate because no lawmaker can envision from 
the start all the cases that might require regulation or formulate aims with enough clarity to re-
solve future confusion fully.  See Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 661–63.  This account of inde-
terminacy dropped out of the Holmes Lecture but reappeared in The Concept of Law.  See HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 126–29. 
 250 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 662.   
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 663.  
 253 Id. at 661.  (Henry) Hart and Sacks offered their own take on vehicles in the park when 
they explained how a “magistrate” would “decide whether a motorcycle is or is not a ‘motor car’ 
within the meaning of a speed statute.”  HART & SACKS, supra note 23, at 143; see also id. at 
143–44.  It is, however, unlikely that (Henry) Hart and Sacks got the idea for this example from 
H. L. A. Hart, because this section of the casebook was finished by the time of H. L. A. Hart’s 
visit.  See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 23, at lxxxviii–xci (discussing the evolution of the draft, 
including earlier versions of chapter one).  Schauer speculates that H. L. A. Hart may in fact have 
borrowed the example from his American colleagues:  
Hart almost certainly drew the example from McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 
(1931), a case in which the question was whether an airplane was a vehicle for purposes 
of a federal statute prohibiting transporting a stolen vehicle across state lines.  I suspect 
that Hart . . . learned of it from Henry Hart, Albert Sacks, or possibly even from Fuller 
himself.  
 Schauer, supra note 244, at 1115 n.20 (citation omitted).   
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Hart offered Interstate Commerce Commission rate-fixing254 as a 
further “dramatic illustration”255 of the limiting “handicaps” on pro-
spective lawmaking.256  The general goal of the rate-fixer, Hart ob-
served, can be stated easily: finding “a rate which is reasonable and 
fair.”257  This general aim is helpful to a limited extent: it does estab-
lish that some rates are clearly out of the question.258  A rate too high 
“would hold the public up to ransom for a vital service” and “defeat 
any purpose that we could have in regulating rates,” while “a rate too 
low to provide any possible incentive for running the railway organiza-
tion or too low to provide returns higher than the occupation of sweep-
ing the streets would normally have to be rejected.”259  Yet the general 
aim provides little guidance when it comes to selecting from among 
rates that are not clearly unacceptable.260  Hart concluded that behind 
the general goal, there are in fact many vague and conflicting aims at 
play: a “grand matrix capable of [an] indefinite number of different 
fillings or completions.”261  Further, changing factual circumstances 
“reveal different factors requiring attention.”262  For example, “[t]here 
may be rates which owing to the predicament of a local industry 
would jeopardize the prosperity of millions but apart from this consid-
eration might well be thought fair.”263 
Indeterminacy, thus, is unavoidable.  The world in which perfect 
prospective lawmaking were possible, he said, “would be the world 
of . . . mechanical Jurisprudence which we have long been taught is 
not our world.”264  Still reeling from Bodenheimer’s false accusation 
that his analytic style amounted to “mechanical jurisprudence” in dis-
guise, Hart was unambiguous in his fresh rejection of legal formalism: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 254 Although rate-fixing is an exercise of “Express or Avowed” Discretion, see Hart, Discretion, 
supra note 12, at 655, the same analysis would apply in the case of “Tacit or Concealed Discre-
tion” (like the “[n]o vehicles in the park” example), see id. at 661–62.   
 255 Id. at 663. 
 256 Id. at 661; see also id. at 663–64. 
 257 Id. at 663.  
 258 Id. at 664. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. at 663–64. 
 262 Id. at 664. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id.  Hart’s analysis of the intrinsic limitations of human knowledge would have appealed to 
many members of the discussion group, who were suspicious of central economic planning and 
attentive to information problems.  Hart’s analysis of the problem of rate-fixing would have been 
particularly relevant to the group, which had recently discussed excerpts from Hayek.  Just as 
Hayek had argued that the centrally planned economy is a figment of the utopian imagination, 
Hart argued that the inherent limits of human knowledge foreclose the possibility of crafting to-
tally determinate law for the future.  See POSTEMA, supra note 51, at 141–80 (discussing Hayek’s 
contribution to mid-twentieth-century American jurisprudence).  
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“Our world,” he said, “is indeed different.”265  “When the actual case 
arises,” a judge will “have to weigh and choose between or make some 
compromise between competing interests.”266  It was to the details of 
this decisionmaking process that Hart turned next, seeking guidance 
for officials lost in the penumbra. 
2.  The Responsibility of Discretion. — What mode of decision-
making should legal officials employ when they confront indeter-
minacy, as they inevitably will?  Hart’s answer was simple: discre- 
tion — the special mode of reasoned decisionmaking he had carefully 
distinguished from other possibilities.267  “[D]iscretion must take its 
place,” Hart wrote, “because the area is really one where reasonable 
and honest men may differ, however well informed of the facts in par-
ticular cases.”268  Pointedly, Hart expected legal officials not to treat 
legal indeterminacy as an opportunity for the exercise of personal 
choice.  “When we are considering the use of discretion in the Law we 
are considering its use by officials who are holding a responsible public 
office,” Hart said.269  “It is therefore understood that if what officials 
are to do is not rigidly determined by specific rules but a choice is left 
to them, they will choose responsibly having regard to their office and 
not indulge fancy or mere whim . . . .”270 
Put slightly differently, Hart’s view was that legal officials ought to 
make decisions that exemplify the features that set discretion apart 
from other forms of decisionmaking.  The criteria for the best exercise 
of discretion are, in this sense, implicit in the concept of discretion it-
self.  Hart’s analysis placed central importance on rationality, the ap-




 265 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 662.  In The Concept of Law, Hart also compared the 
world of perfect information to the world of mechanical jurisprudence.  See HART, THE CON-
CEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 128.  But in the Discretion paper he additionally stated that 
“[o]ur world is indeed different” to emphasize to his Harvard audience his belief that analytical 
and mechanical jurisprudence are not allies.  Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 662.    
 266 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 663.  
 267 Reiterating a point he made earlier, Hart again observed that when the limitation on our 
ability to regulate the future is “patent at the outset,” lawmakers sometimes “confer a discretion-
ary jurisdiction on some official or authority” to make relevant decisions in the future, when more 
information is available and the particular application of vague general aims is clearer, resulting 
in “Avowed Discretion.”  Id. at 661.  When the limitation is “not so patent” at the outset, lawmak-
ers try to craft prospective rules, and “though we may proceed happily with them over a wide 
area,” in some cases “the rules break down and supply no unique answer in a given case.”  Id.  
Here the result is “Tacit or Disguised Discretion.”  Id.  Note that here Hart called it “Tacit or Dis-
guised” whereas in other instances he called it “Tacit or Concealed.”   
 268 Id. at 664.  
 269 Id. at 657. 
 270 Id.  
 2013] H. L. A. HART’S LOST ESSAY 707 
(a)  Rationality. — First, discretionary decisions are rational.  Dis-
cretion, for Hart, is reasoned decisionmaking rooted in principles “de-
serving of rational approval,”271 and sound discretionary decisions are 
decisions living up to that standard.  More specifically, rationality in 
discretionary decisionmaking requires a certain method of decision: 
“[D]ecisions involving discretion are rational primarily because of the 
manner in which they are made,” he wrote, and must include “the de-
termined effort to identify what are the various values which have to 
be considered and subjected in the course of discretion to some form of 
compromise and subordination.”272 
Hart did not spell out exactly what he meant by “reason” or “ra-
tional approval.”  Indeed, a weakness of his essay is that he did not 
discuss in more detail how, precisely, the demand for rationality con-
strains decisionmaking.  But he seemed to have expected sound discre-
tionary reasoning to display not just logical integrity, but also a form 
of practical wisdom, associating the term “discretion” with “practical 
wisdom or sagacity or prudence”273 and praising “rational” decisions 
with words like “wise” and “sound.”274 
As we have seen, Hart’s stress on reason and rational justification 
in discretion is strikingly consistent with the Process School’s idea of 
reasoned elaboration as a normative requirement for sound judicial 
decisionmaking.  Hart and the process theorists shared the view that 
“rationality” is a demanding requirement, and one that judges and 
other legal officials are obliged to fulfill. 
(b)  Choice of Factors. — Hart believed that all discretion — 
whether “Avowed” or “Tacit or Concealed” — must be exercised ra-
tionally.  But pushing further, he also believed that different types of 
discretionary decisions, arising in different positions in the legal pro-
cess, require attention to different factors.  Hart said that we must 
“characterize what in each field are the factors which require our at-
tention if discretion is to be soundly exercised.”275 
For Hart, there was a connection between the type of discretion in 
question and how it should be exercised.  “[T]he type of factor to 
which weight would be properly attached in the exercise of discretion 
will vary in different types of situations,” he wrote.276  In particular, 
the “Avowed Discretion”277 arising from a specific regulatory delega-
tion calls for a different deliberative process than does the “Tacit or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 271 Id.  
 272 Id. at 664.   
 273 Id. at 656.   
 274 Id. at 657.  
 275 Id. at 665.    
 276 Id. at 655.   
 277 Id. at 656.   
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Concealed Discretion” arising from the indeterminacy of rules or from 
different possibilities for the use of precedent.278  The way the discre-
tion comes about in the first place significantly influences the factors 
that the official charged with exercising the discretion should consider 
when carrying it out.  In fact, Hart specifically said that one of his 
principal motivations for distinguishing between “Tacit or Concealed” 
and “Avowed” discretion was to show that these different forms of dis-
cretion require attention to different sets of factors, reflecting their dif-
ferent institutional provenances.279 
This point is significant: Hart acknowledged that the set of factors 
that should be considered in the exercise of discretion is a function of 
the type of discretion at issue, and therefore relates to the position in 
the legal process of the official charged with exercising it.  Although 
Hart fell short of specifying exactly what these factors are, it is clear 
that he believed an administrative official fixing a rate or a Fish and 
Game Commissioner deciding when to end hunting season should refer 
to a set of concerns quite different from that of an appellate judge in-
terpreting a statute.  Though Hart’s theory on this point remains im-
perfectly developed, his analysis resonated with process theory’s focus 
on institutional competence.  He believed that officials in different set-
tings should make decisions in light of factors appropriate to the spe-
cific role those officials are called upon to play — interpreter of rules, 
applier of standards, setter of rates, opener of free season on elk, and 
so forth. 
(c)  Justification. — Finally, Hart thought that a sound exercise of 
discretion, if rational and based on the right factors, can be justified.  
Recall that Hart held that discretionary decisions are primarily justi-
fied by reconstructing the reasoning process that led to the decision, 
though they can also be vindicated by the actual success of the deci-
sion once implemented.  This emphasis on justification — defense of 
decisionmaking by appeal to the process of the decision and the  
reasons for it — resonated with the Process School’s view that  
judges have a professional responsibility to explain their decisions in  
writing.280 
The process theorists were concerned with the written exposition of 
decisions partly because they believed that it helps to bolster the no-
tion that adjudication is a professional craft, one that calls for exper-
tise, scrutiny, and continuous reflection.281  Hart, too, believed that 
discretion is a craft that can be improved with experience.  We “learn 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 278 Id. at 655.   
 279 See id. at 655–56.   
 280 See White, supra note 51, at 286 (describing how Harvard Law Review Forewords from the 
mid-1950s chastised the Supreme Court for overreliance on per curiam opinions).   
 281 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 25, at 923–24.   
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from a series of vindications certain new factors making for success to 
which we must also attend henceforth if our choices are to be justifia-
ble.  There is a progressive evolutionary discovery of important and 
hence justifying factors.”282 
3.  Hart’s Solution to the Problem of Legal Indeterminacy. — Hart 
mentioned that discretion “worrie[d]” his colleagues.283  He was aware 
that the post-realist, post-Brown process theorists were concerned that 
choice in law and the rule of law are in tension.  Yet in Hart’s view, 
indeterminacy can be fully consistent with the rule of law if the offi-
cials charged with resolving it exercise genuine discretion: if they ap-
peal to principles “deserving of rational approval” and identify and 
weigh the factors that are properly relevant.  When it came to judges, 
Hart’s analysis was in lockstep with process theory: the criteria for 
good decisions provide a constraint on judicial power, ensuring that 
decisions are rooted in rational principles, not dependent on the  
personal “fancy” or “whim” of the judge, and grounded in appropriate  
factors.284 
For Hart, discretion presented a solution to the problem of inde-
terminacy, not a problem of its own.  In light of the “handicaps” on our 
ability to regulate the future, it is the possibility of sound discretion 
that makes the entire project of prospective lawmaking possible in  
the first place.285  Hart saw discretion as essential, not antithetical, to  
the rule of law: it is the job to be done when indeterminacy inevitably  
arises. 
III.  THE LEGACY OF DISCRETION:  
THE HARTS, FULLER, AND DWORKIN 
A few days after his presentation, Hart described the occasion in a 
letter to his wife.  He noted that he had provoked “a strong debate try-
ing to convince lawyers they had better start analyzing” the terms of 
their discussion more carefully, instead of “asking 9 undifferentiated 
questions at once.”286  He sounded pleased with his performance, im-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 282 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 660.  
 283 Id. at 654. 
 284 Dorf also reminds us that for Hart, some (judicial) cases do not require discretion, because 
the outcome is clearly determined by stated rules.  See Dorf, supra note 25, at 911–12, 912 n.129.  
Thus, part of Hart’s solution to the problem of indeterminacy could be that indeterminacy arises 
in only a small number of cases.  Discretion adds to this analysis by demonstrating that Hart also 
believed that the style of reasoning involved in discretion presents another constraint on the range 
of possible outcomes. 
 285 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 661. 
 286 Letter from H. L. A. Hart to Jenifer Hart, supra note 2.  Lacey picks up on the language of 
this letter in her biography of Hart when she notes that he “provoked a stormy debate.”  LACEY, 
supra note 16, at 188.  
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pressed with his new colleagues, and hopeful for what the group could 
accomplish: 
In spite of (or perhaps because of) the storm, I was judged a suc-
cess . . . .  It’s quite commendable that these busy & rather proud lawyers 
with a v. vocational or practical slant should do this.  So we’ll see what 
happens. . . . [T]he young lecturers . . . were pleased to see the potentates 
challenged: not that the potentates are bad here: they are very good.287 
What Hart probably did not realize is that the ideas he expressed 
would play pivotal roles in jurisprudence in the next half century, pro-
voking a debate with Henry Hart, launching his decades-long quarrel 
with Fuller, and mapping some of the arguments he deployed in his 
response, decades later, to Dworkin — a student of Fuller and both 
Harts and an editor of this Review during “Harvard’s Jurisprudence 
Year.”288 
A.  The Hart-Hart Debate? 
Hart reflected more publicly on his participation in the Legal Phi-
losophy Discussion Group the next winter in a BBC broadcast — “dis-
charged on the British public, or such parts as listen to the Third Pro-
gramme,”289 he joked to another participant in the Group — which 
was subsequently published in the BBC magazine The Listener.  
Fuller read Hart’s reflection and sent copies to Justice Frankfurter290 
and “[p]resent and [f]ormer [m]embers” of the discussion group (which 
had reconvened the next year, without the visitors).291  This time, Hart 
sounded frustrated at his colleagues’ distaste for linguistic analysis: 
I remember meeting with some colleagues, lawyers and philosophers, to 
discuss the notion of a discretion in the judicial process.  This is a matter 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 287 Letter from H. L. A. Hart to Jenifer Hart, supra note 2 (emphasis omitted).  
 288 LACEY, supra note 16, at 185–86 (discussing Dworkin’s activities as a Harvard Law student 
that year).  
 289 Letter from H. L. A. Hart, Professor of Jurisprudence, Univ. of Oxford, to Morton White, 
Professor of Philosophy, Harvard Univ. (Dec. 18, 1957) (on file with the New College Library, 
University of Oxford).  
 290 See Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Lon Fuller, Professor of Law, Harvard Law 
Sch. (Apr. 1, 1958) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Papers of Lon L. Fuller, Box 3, 
Folder 15).  Justice Frankfurter wrote:  
You are very generous to co-opt me into your legal philosophy discussion group, even if 
only to the extent of sending me the extract from H. L. A. Hart’s talk over the B.B.C.  
As a regular reader of The Listener, I had already seen the full text of his address, but 
this did not lessen in the slightest the pleasure you gave me in remembering me among 
your correspondents.  
Id. at 1.  Hart, for his part, steered clear of Justice Frankfurter during his year in the United 
States; he once called Justice Frankfurter a “chattering monkey.”  LACEY, supra note 16, at 187 
(quoting Hart).   
 291 See Memorandum from Lon L. Fuller, Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., to Present and 
Former Members of the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group 1 (undated) (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library, Papers of Henry M. Hart, Jr., Box 35, Folder 8).  
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of importance for Americans, who wonder whether or not their adminis-
trative agencies are not too free in the discretionary powers conferred up-
on them, and my friends detailed a large number of problems for discus-
sion.  I began with the suggestion that we might first consider what a 
discretion was, and how the judgements that we called discretionary differ 
from other forms of judgements which are the task of an official within 
the legal system to make.  Nothing could have been more repellent than 
this suggestion that we should assist things by studying what was meant 
by the key words in the discussion.292 
Hart was right: linguistic and conceptual analysis did not go over 
well at first.  While H. L. A. Hart was giving his oral presentation, 
Henry Hart scribbled at the bottom of the handout, “I am very little 
concerned with the ‘true meaning’ of discretion, or with the meaning 
in which ‘discretion’ is used in ordinary speech,” noting that he pre-
ferred to focus on the “function of discretion, not verbal usage.”293 
For his part, H. L. A. Hart looked warily on Henry Hart’s personal 
style at first, with an outsider’s detached amusement: “He was mad-
deningly nervous.  Before giving an undergraduate lecture he would 
pace up and down smoking cigarettes for about two hours.”294  But 
over the course of the year, the two Harts encountered each other “a 
lot.”295  In the wake of H. L. A. Hart’s analysis of discretion, they had 
occasion for a direct exchange — a Hart-Hart debate296 — when  
Henry Hart delivered his own lecture on the same subject. 
At the next meeting of the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group, 
which took place just one day after H. L. A. Hart circulated the writ-
ten version of Discretion, Henry Hart addressed the group on The 
Place of Discretion in the Legal System.297  It was clear that he found 
H. L. A. Hart’s paper deeply provocative, and in many respects right, 
which may explain why he kept it in his files for the rest of his life and 
made reference to it in future correspondence.298  Henry Hart’s notes 
for his talk, which survive in his archive, reveal significant points of 
agreement, even direct influence, between the two Harts, while also 
clarifying their fundamental differences.299 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 292 H. L. A. Hart, A View of America, THE LISTENER, Jan. 16, 1958, at 89, 90.  
 293 Outline of Paper on Discretion 4 (undated) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, 
Papers of Henry M. Hart, Jr., Box 35, Folder 7) (Henry Hart’s annotated copy of H. L. A. Hart’s 
handout).  
 294 Sugarman, supra note 124, at 280 (quoting H. L. A. Hart).  
 295 Id. (quoting H. L. A. Hart).  
 296 If Fuller, Patrick Devlin, and Dworkin will excuse the intrusion. 
 297 See Hart Notes on The Place of Discretion in the Legal System, supra note 23. 
 298 See Nov. 5, 1957, Letter from Henry Hart to Lon Fuller, supra note 18, at 1 (referring to 
“Herbert Hart” and his contribution to their discussions on adjudication).  
 299 See Hart Notes on The Place of Discretion in the Legal System, supra note 23.   
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Henry Hart reiterated the idea that indeterminacy is inevitable 
“[b]ecause we are men, not gods,”300 specifically quoting H. L. A. Hart 
and mentioning “[H. L. A.] Hart’s two interrelated factors of ignorance 
of future facts and ignorance of future aims.”301  Henry Hart seemed 
to restate the idea that aims and purposes, while important in law, are 
often vague, observing that “many purposes can be best judged from 
the perspective of application of policies,” in which case, “as [H. L. A.] 
Hart put it, aims can be seen in conjunction with the specific situation 
to which decision relates.”302  And like H. L. A. Hart, Henry Hart be-
lieved that the indulgence of personal whim has no place in law: “[t]he 
idea of a ‘purely arbitrary’ but other-regarding choice,” he suggested, 
“is a legal and ethical monstrosity, and is inadmissible.”303 
Thus, for Henry Hart, the existence of indeterminacy in law posed 
a problem to be solved by identifying constraints on decisionmaking.  
Accordingly, he set out to characterize exactly what distinguishes legit-
imate legal decisionmaking from “purely arbitrary” choice.  For one, 
Henry Hart stated that the “bounds of permissible choice”304 are re-
stricted in legitimate decisionmaking, reiterating H. L. A. Hart’s point 
that even though there are no right answers to questions calling for 
discretion, there are clear wrong answers.  Moreover, Henry Hart not-
ed that the appropriate “factors and criteria to guide decision”305 may 
provide a constraint, recalling H. L. A. Hart’s key idea that the factors 
to be considered in discretionary decisionmaking vary depending on 
the type of discretion in question. 
Ultimately, Henry Hart seems to have believed that the term “dis-
cretion” is a misleading description of what judges should do in the 
sphere of indeterminacy.  He proposed “reasoned elaboration of [the] 
grounds of decision” as a check on discretion,306 while H. L. A. Hart  
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 300 Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 301 Id.  
 302 Id.  
 303 Id. at 4 (phrases “but other-regarding” and “and ethical” penciled in).  He went on to distin-
guish between the case of legal officials for whom this is “self-evident,” and private persons, 
where it is “more nearly arguable.”  Id.   
 304 Id.  
 305 Id. at 5 (quotation penciled in).  
 306 Id.  There is a distinct sense in Henry Hart’s notes that he used the word “discretion,” in 
contrast to “reasoned elaboration,” to denote relatively free, if not entirely arbitrary, choice — de-
spite H. L. A. Hart’s analysis to the contrary.  See Sebok, supra note 22, at 101 (commenting on 
reasoned elaboration and discretion in Henry Hart’s talk).  In this sense, one might infer from 
Henry Hart’s essay alone that H. L. A. Hart had admitted that “much discretion could not be 
controlled by law.”  Cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 23, at ci.  In fact, H. L. A. Hart believed 
that the concept of discretion itself provides a constraint on decisionmaking from within, in subtle 
contrast to Henry Hart’s thought that the demand for reasoned elaboration constrains discretion 
from without.  Either way, the two Harts agreed on the importance of rational constraints on le-
gal decisionmaking.   
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believed that the major tenets of reasoned elaboration are actually im-
plicit in the concept of discretion itself.  For H. L. A. Hart, genuine 
discretion, as opposed to arbitrary choice, is reasoned elaboration. 
Despite the rational constraints of reasoned elaboration, Henry 
Hart still worried that decisionmaking in indeterminate cases permits 
too much free choice.  Accordingly, he turned to “[p]ressures toward 
the reasoned elaboration of grounds of decision, even where this is not 
an obligation,” focusing more on institutional design than on the ethics 
of official action.307  Indeed, Henry Hart pushed beyond H. L. A. 
Hart’s analysis and identified “[e]xtrinsic checks” on discretionary 
power, including elections, impeachment, reappointment, and powers 
of review.308  H. L. A. Hart, however, had mentioned, though not de-
tailed, the possibility of extrinsic constraints the week before, high-
lighting the responsibility of reasoned discretion even though “it may 
of course be that the system fails to provide a remedy if [officials] do 
indulge their whim”309 — acknowledging the possibility of such reme-
dies, but holding firm that the legal system asks more of those to 
whom it commits discretion than merely to evade extrinsic check. 
As Henry Hart’s thinking developed, he began to wonder whether 
judicial decisions in indeterminate cases could ever be objectively cor-
rect.  In November 1957, just months after H. L. A. Hart’s departure 
from Harvard, Henry Hart wrote to Fuller to explain the “analysis I 
have been reaching for lately in trying to distinguish the exercise of 
discretion from the exercise of the judicial function.”310  “Discretion, it 
seems to me,” he wrote, “involves the act of choice between two or 
more alternatives . . . each of which is regarded as permissible.  Adju-
dication involves choice between two alternatives, one of which is re-
garded as right . . . .”311  He seemed to be searching for legal certainty, 
nursing a distinctly proto-Dworkinian sentiment and departing from 
H. L. A. Hart’s view that indeterminacy is an inherent part of law and 
discretion an inherent part of adjudication.  Yet Henry Hart’s thinking 
did not take him down a fundamentally different track from H. L. A. 
Hart’s analysis in Discretion: Henry Hart went on to concede that 
“‘[r]ight’ means rationally justifiable by reasoning from settled or 
properly assumed premises,”312 which harmonized with H. L. A. 
Hart’s criterion for sound discretion. 
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 307 Hart Notes on The Place of Discretion in the Legal System, supra note 23, at 5 (emphasis 
added).  
 308 Id.   
 309 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 657.  
 310 Nov. 5, 1957, Letter from Henry Hart to Lon Fuller, supra note 18, at 2.  
 311 Id.  
 312 Id.  
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Henry Hart’s famous Foreword to the 1958 Supreme Court Term 
(which he largely completed during the Legal Philosophy Discussion 
Group’s first year313) pursued the theme of rational certainty in law 
further.314  As Professor G. Edward White interprets it, Hart’s Fore-
word professed a deep faith in reason.315  Hart suggested that, “given 
adequate time and discussion, the thinking of judges about particular 
cases, perhaps initially a product of their idiosyncratic presuppositions, 
could mature into something more synonymous with ‘reason,’ a 
suprapersonal construct.”316  Hart’s Foreword “assumed that for every 
judicial problem there is ultimately a ‘reasonable’ solution.”317  Here, 
Henry Hart’s notion of judicial evolution toward reason is similar to a 
view H. L. A. Hart had expressed in Discretion: the idea that judg- 
es — perhaps even the legal system as an organic whole — can get 
better at discretionary decisionmaking with experience, in light of 
what H. L. A. Hart called the “progressive evolutionary discovery of 
important and hence justifying factors.”318  Although Henry Hart 
again flirted with the possibility of one “‘reasonable’ solution” to every 
case, he ultimately agreed with H. L. A. Hart that indeterminacy is in-
evitable in some cases, no matter how sound the process, how experi-
enced the judge, or how mature the legal system. 
In light of these points of similarity, the Hart-Hart debate turned 
out not to be much of a debate at all.  The two Harts expressed con-
siderable agreement about the necessity of indeterminacy in the legal 
system and the responsibilities of officials charged with its resolution. 
There were also, of course, lasting differences.  Despite the meeting 
of the minds about the obligations of legal decisionmakers, Henry Hart 
was primarily concerned with law’s institutional realization and skep-
tical of the value of H. L. A. Hart’s linguistic philosophy.  Yet eventu-
ally, and perhaps grudgingly, Henry Hart came to recognize some  
virtue in analyzing the linguistic and conceptual nature of discre- 
tion — even highlighting the importance of such an analysis in The 
Legal Process materials themselves.  The editors asked in the preface 
to the “tentative edition” presented in 1958: “What, if any, are the dif-
ferences between the discretion of a court and the discretion of legisla-
tors?  Or of the discretion of administrative officials in various kinds 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 313 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 2048.   
 314 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term — Foreword: The Time Chart of the 
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959). 
 315 See White, supra note 51, at 287–88. 
 316 Id. at 287. 
 317 Id. 
 318 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 660.  H. L. A. Hart’s notion that discretionary 
decisionmaking can evolve for the better also resonates, on a less systematic level, with Henry 
Hart’s notion of “the maturing of collective thought.”  White, supra note 51, at 288 (quoting 
Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart’s Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1312 (1960)).  
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of contexts?  Or of the discretion of private persons?  What, anyway, 
do we mean by ‘discretion’?”319  Although the editors did not explicitly 
attribute this line of thought to H. L. A. Hart, the influence of his 
analysis of discretion is clear.320 
Continuing his initial interest in his namesake’s thinking, Henry 
Hart watched H. L. A. Hart’s career closely in the years after they first 
met.  In 1965, four years after H. L. A. Hart wrote The Concept of Law 
and after several exchanges with Fuller, Henry Hart wrote a lengthy 
memo to Fuller analyzing H. L. A. Hart’s jurisprudence.  “I myself am 
disposed to . . . define law openly (in substance if not in the same 
words) as ‘the enterprise of subjecting men to the governance of rules 
in such a way as to realize, as well as may be, the benefits of social liv-
ing,’” Henry Hart wrote,321 in contrast to H. L. A. Hart’s definition of 
law as a system of rules identified by a rule of recognition.  Indeed, for 
Henry Hart, law is a dynamic social enterprise, not a static system of 
rules.  Henry Hart understood law as a “purposive activity” inextrica-
bly linked to the values it seeks to realize and the ends it aims to 
achieve.322  He believed that legal analysis that ignores those ends, in 
the process expelling value from the province of jurisprudence, neces-
sarily ignores some of law’s most significant characteristics.323  The 
most fundamental difference between the Harts, therefore, was that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 319 HART & SACKS, supra note 23, at cxxxviii.  
 320 Sebok notes that H. L. A. Hart made one explicit appearance in The Legal Process, when 
the editors discussed his “definition of duty.”  SEBOK, supra note 22, at 169. 
 321 Henry M. Hart, Jr., Some Notes on H. L. A. H.’s Review 3 (Feb. 9, 1965) (on file in the 
Harvard Law School Library, Papers of Lon L. Fuller, Box 3, Folder 14) (analyzing H. L. A. 
Hart’s review of Fuller’s The Morality of Law, almost to the point of obsession).  Although Henry 
Hart clearly took Fuller’s side in the (H. L. A.) Hart-Fuller exchange, Henry Hart recognized 
some weaknesses in Fuller’s position.   
 322 HART & SACKS, supra note 23, at 148. 
 323 While the process theorists believed that legal theory needs to reflect law’s status as a “pur-
posive activity,” they expected the legal process itself to be as value-neutral as possible, providing 
a guide for social cooperation for citizens regardless of their substantive value preferences.  Ac-
cording to one scholar, a professor connected with the Process School “joked that the essence of 
his philosophy was summed up by the Fats Waller song ‘It Ain’t Whatcha Do, It’s the Way 
Thatcha Do It.’”  GEOFFREY KABASERVICE, THE GUARDIANS 110 (2004).  Further, for  
(Henry) Hart and Sacks, “the fundamental purpose of society [was], to the extent possible, to 
‘maximize the total satisfactions of valid human wants.’”  Barzun, supra note 16, at 21 (quoting 
HART & SACKS, supra note 23, at 104).  This purpose bespoke a utilitarian — not perfectionist — 
aim in law (as well as a singular faith in the power of technocratic government).  The legal pro-
cess, for (Henry) Hart and Sacks, serves to decentralize value choices, further reflecting the liber-
alism of the Cold War era.  Further, the “principle of institutional settlement,” HART & SACKS, 
supra note 23, at 4 (emphasis omitted), associated legal validity with institutional provenance, not 
substantive outcome — linking (Henry) Hart and Sacks with the positivist sources thesis.  Yet 
from their theoretical perspective, law, the tool society uses to further its goals, is unintelligible 
except in light of its fundamental objectives, Hayekian and somewhat utilitarian as they may be.  
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Henry Hart despised legal positivism.324  He “was tremendously 
against positivism,” H. L. A. Hart recalled.325  “And while he thought 
one or two things I’d done were good,” — presumably, the analysis of 
discretion chief among them — he “felt I was tragically misleading.”326 
B.  Purposivism and Positivism:  
Discretion and the Hart-Fuller Debate 
While Discretion provoked a short-lived Hart-Hart debate, it also 
launched the legendary Hart-Fuller debate, the quarrel over the con-
ceptual relationship between law and morality that remains a corner-
stone of jurisprudence today.  Although the direct impetus for the writ-
ten Hart-Fuller exchange was Hart’s Holmes Lecture in April — at 
which Fuller paced “‘back and forth at the back of the lecture hall like 
a hungry lion’ and [left] half way through the question session”327 — 
the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group, and the discussion surround-
ing Discretion, likely provided Hart’s first point of direct academic 
engagement with Fuller, who listened carefully, unaware that he would 
one day be remembered as one of Hart’s most famous interlocutors.328  
Although the Hart-Fuller debate has provoked a vast secondary litera-
ture, Discretion clarifies Hart’s early position on the role of purpose in 
law — a pivotal topic that received relatively little treatment in later 
rounds of the debate. 
For Fuller, purpose lay at the core of the law in two connected 
ways, each informing his antipositivism.  First, law’s purposive char-
acter is part of law’s definition: law is a “purposive activity,” and a le-
gal theory that ignores law’s purposive character is as inaccurate as 
any other reductively externalist description of purposive human con-
duct.329  Second, legal reasoning and adjudication require an attempt 
to give effect to the specific purposes underpinning the laws at issue.330 
Discretion demonstrates that Hart took a nuanced, split position on 
this issue — a position he did not make as clear in later work.  In 
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 324 See Hart, supra note 63, at 932, 936 (describing Justice Holmes’s “uncomprising positivism,” 
id. at 932, and asserting that he “confused the relationship of law and morals,” id. at 936); see also 
supra note 116.   
 325 Sugarman, supra note 124, at 280 (quoting Hart). 
 326 Id. (quoting Hart) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 327 LACEY, supra note 16, at 197 (quoting a July 1991 letter from Joel Feinberg to H. L. A. 
Hart). 
 328 For an account of Fuller’s pre-Hart legal theory, see RUNDLE, supra note 61, at 25–48. 
 329 For examples on this point, see Lon L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 53 J. 
PHIL. 697, 697–99 (1956), an essay Fuller wrote shortly after Hart’s Discretion.  
 330 See Leiter, supra note 29, at 1157 (“[T]he Legal Process theory of adjudication as ‘reasoned 
elaboration’ involves an essentially anti-positivist view of law, because it makes morality a criteri-
on of legality by its emphasis on ‘purposive’ interpretation.”); Sebok, supra note 37, at 1575 (sug-
gesting that (Henry) Hart and Sacks adopted Fuller’s theory of adjudication).  See generally 
Fuller, supra note 139.    
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Hart’s view, purpose is indeed a part of legal reasoning, but not fun-
damentally relevant to what makes law law.  Hart agreed with 
Fuller’s epistemic claim that adjudication and legal reasoning involve 
purposive analysis.  But he rejected Fuller’s ontological claim that 
law’s purposive character and the goals law pursues are part of law’s 
definition — part of what distinguishes law from other forms of social 
ordering.331 
1.  Purpose in Legal Reasoning. — In Discretion, Hart suggested 
that discretionary decisionmakers are required to analyze and weigh 
the law’s perhaps unclear, perhaps conflicting general aims — the po-
tential vagueness of which is itself the source of much indeterminacy 
in law (owing to the “Relative Indeterminacy of Aim”) — and reformu-
late those aims so they can apply more clearly to the case at hand, 
producing “pro tanto” determinacy.332 
Hart’s example of a judge applying the standard of due care in civ-
il negligence,333 a case in which the “Relative Ignorance of Fact” and 
the “Relative Indeterminacy of Aim” collude to create indeterminacy, 
illustrates how Hart understood purposive analysis fitting into discre-
tion.  Hart observed that the due care standard indeed has purposes, 
easily stated at a general level: 
What we are striving for in the application of standards of reasonable care 
is (1) to insure that precautions will be taken which will avert substantial 
harm, yet (2) that the precautions are such that the burden of proper  
precautions does not involve too great a sacrifice of other respectable  
interests.334 
But he pointed out that these aims prove vague and indeterminate 
when applied to specific, unforeseen cases.  In application, the discre-
tionary process requires the judge to “weigh and choose between or 
make some compromise between competing interests and thus render 
more determinate our initial aim.”335  Put this way, Hart saw discre-
tion as a process of rationally reformulating and contextualizing gen-
eral aims so that they can more determinatively apply to specific cases.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 331 There are of course numerous theoretical positions legal positivists might adopt on the ques-
tion of purpose in law, and numerous complicating questions philosophers might ask.  Discretion 
did not take up this issue as a problem in need of direct, careful explication.  Hart’s essay did, 
however, sketch a position that clarifies his basic response to Fuller.  It also helps to reveal the 
dilemmas that led Hart to endorse “soft positivism” decades later, once the distinction between 
hard and soft positivism had been introduced.  See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 
41, at 250.  Hart took law’s most basic purposes more seriously in The Concept of Law, however, 
where he defended the thesis that law’s fundamental goal of facilitating human survival demands 
a “minimum content” to any legal order.  See id. at 193–200.   
 332 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 663. 
 333 Id.  This example and accompanying explanation appeared almost verbatim in The Concept 
of Law.  See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 132–33.    
 334 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 663.  
 335 Id. 
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In the case of the due care standard, “our aim of securing people 
against harm is indeterminate til we put it in conjunction [with] or test 
it against possibilities which only experience will bring before us: when 
it does then we have to face a decision which will, when made, render 
our aim pro tanto determinate.”336  Once the aim is so rendered, the 
judge can combine it with other relevant factors, which, all together, 
can have the cumulative effect of making the case itself “pro tanto de-
terminate” and therefore resolved, though not perfectly conclusively.337 
2.  Purpose in Legal Theory. — Although Hart clearly envisioned 
purpose factoring into legal reasoning, he seemed to reject the claim 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 336 Id. (alteration in original).  
 337 It is worth noting that even though Hart’s illustration of legal reasoning was restricted to 
indeterminate cases (mainly those cases with vague or conflicting purposes), Discretion contained 
inklings of the idea that purposive analysis is part of legal reasoning even in core cases.  As we 
have seen, in the Holmes Lecture, Hart attributed legal indeterminacy to linguistic indeterminacy.  
A rule proves indeterminate in application because of the inherent vagueness of the words with 
which the rule is expressed.  But in Discretion, Hart did not discuss the indeterminacy of lan-
guage; he attributed legal indeterminacy to the “handicaps” on prospective lawmaking (something 
he mentioned again in The Concept of Law) — among them the “Relative Indeterminacy of Aim.”  
Id. at 661; HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 41, at 125.  This account of indeterminacy 
has two implications.  First, and most obviously, unclear aims and goals can be a source of inde-
terminacy in cases where the law does not apply clearly, and discretion becomes necessary.  Sec-
ond, and less obviously, clear aims and goals can be a source of determinacy in cases where the 
law does apply clearly.  Purpose is part of what makes easy cases easy, just as it is part of what 
makes hard cases hard.  Fuller, however, understood Hart as endorsing purposive analysis only in 
the penumbra.  Fuller wrote, summarizing Hart’s theory:  
When the object in question (say, a tricycle) falls within this penumbral area, the judge 
is forced to assume a more creative role.  He must now undertake, for the first time, an 
interpretation of the rule in the light of its purpose or aim.  Having in mind what was 
sought by the regulation concerning parks, ought it to be considered as barring tricycles? 
Fuller, supra note 139, at 662.  For a discussion on this point see TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 
168–69 (noting that Hart foresaw purpose as relevant only in indeterminate cases, while Fuller 
argued that purpose always enters the picture).  In a later work, in 1983, Hart revisited this point, 
stating explicitly that purpose could be relevant to “what it is that makes clear cases clear.”  
HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 46, at 8; see also 
TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 245 n.59.  While this conception of purpose may have been a con-
cession in light of the Holmes Lecture, Discretion may suggest that this idea was part of Hart’s 
position all along, though clearly not fully worked out.  Hart confessed that he put too much 
weight in the Holmes Lecture on the indeterminacy of legal language, and that he ignored the role 
purpose plays in clarifying purely linguistic indeterminacy: “[T]he obvious or agreed purpose of a 
rule may be used to render determinate a rule whose application may be left open by the conven-
tions of language.”  HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 46, at 8.  
In other words, Hart did envision purposive analysis in the core; in fact, purpose is part of what 
designates these cases as core cases, though they may appear penumbral when viewed from a 
purely linguistic perspective.  It would be a mistake to infer from this observation that Hart envi-
sioned a semantic hierarchy in which purpose can enter the analysis only if language is indetermi-
nate: Hart also said that “the obvious or agreed purpose of a rule . . . may serve to show that 
words in the context of a legal rule may have a meaning different from that which they have in 
other contexts,” suggesting that purpose and language contribute mutually to the meaning of legal 
rules in core cases.  Id.  Importantly, Hart reiterated that purposes are not always “obvious  
or agreed” upon — there are always genuinely indeterminate cases with genuinely unclear  
purposes.  Id.   
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that purpose is relevant to law’s fundamental definition.  For that mat-
ter, he seemed to reject the claim that purpose can be relevant to  
anything’s fundamental definition.  Near the start of Discretion, Hart  
noted that: 
  Very often . . . the question “What is X?” and the question “For what 
purposes do we in fact use X?” must be considered together.  This is obvi-
ously the case where the expression in question, X, like the word “knife” 
turns out on investigation to refer to some instrument designed for some 
purpose.338   
With terms like “knife,” Hart observed, “what the thing is used for ac-
tually enters in to the meaning of the expression.”339 
Hart’s key observation, though, was that it is impossible to deter-
mine ex ante whether purpose is an important component of a term’s 
meaning.  Whether something has essential, latent purposes can be 
discovered only after an initial purpose- and value-free linguistic anal-
ysis has taken place: “[W]hether this [that is, purpose being a compo-
nent of meaning] is the case or not cannot be settled in advance of in-
quiring what the standard use of the term in question is.”340  Hart 
seemed to accept — ex post — that law is indeed a purpose-laden en-
deavor (like a knife), but he rejected the claim that law’s purposive 
character is part of law’s definition. 
This analysis reflected Hart’s deeper philosophical approach to def-
inition.  In his Inaugural Lecture in 1953, he had rejected the genus-
species approach to definition (on which purpose can be an element of 
definition: of sharp objects, knives are those designed and used for cut-
ting, and so on) in favor of an approach rooted in ordinary language 
usage.341  In the words of Discretion, definition only involves deter-
mining “what the standard use of the term in question is.”342  Accord-
ingly, the philosophical determination of what something is does not 
involve analysis of what it is for; the purposive inquiry is a secondary 
question to be answered after a definition has been formulated.  The 
law is no exception. 
In Discretion, Hart lamented that confusion on this point muddles 
philosophical discussion, observing that attempts at definition some-
times become forums for debates about what the thing being “defined” 
ought to be like.  “An example of this situation is, I think, discussion of 
what the State is,” Hart wrote.343   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 338 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 654.  
 339 Id.  Hart seemed particularly interested in cutlery throughout his essay.   
 340 Id. 
 341 Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, supra note 104.   
 342 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 654.  
 343 Id.  
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[T]here is little disagreement that the State is in fact an organization of 
persons living on a territory under a certain type of legal system: the real 
dispute is more as to what form the State should take consistent with  
these primary features and what we want the State to [do] for us.344   
Hart further believed that any helpful discussion of “what form the 
state should take” or “what we want the state to [do] for us” (or indeed 
what role discretion should play in the legal system) can proceed only 
after one formulates an analytical definition based on linguistic usage. 
As Hart understood it, therefore, his account of legal reasoning in 
Discretion did not commit him to an antipositivist position.  The sepa-
ration of epistemology from ontology gave him a way to accept that 
legal reasoning requires the appeal to value-laden factors while at the 
same time maintaining that legal theory, the bird’s-eye philosophical 
account of the whole legal system, can be entirely value-neutral and 
positivistic.  Thus Discretion did not cede ground to Hart’s American 
colleagues in the broader dispute over the fact-value distinction.  The 
essay revealed Hart to be a purposivist and a positivist; he remained 
firm that legal reasoning and legal theory are different things.  Just as 
Hart had admonished the realists for being too quick to leap from the 
fact of judicial choice to the prediction theory of law, he found fault 
with Fuller for being too quick to leap from the fact of purposive legal 
reasoning to the conceptual integration of law and morality. 
The compatibility of Hart’s embrace of purposive analysis in dis-
cretion with his firm separation of fact from value on a definitional 
level was a theme to which Hart returned without much detail in fur-
ther exchanges with Fuller.  In his Holmes Lecture, Hart cited “the 
rightness of deciding cases by reference to social purposes” but focused 
more closely on explaining how Fuller’s claim that legal reasoning re-
quires reference to purpose does not entail a logical connection be-
tween law and morality.345  In a later round of the debate, Hart would 
again deny that the identification of law as a “purposive activity” 
proves a necessary connection between law and morality, this time 
making the slightly different argument that “the notions of purposive 
activity and morality” are “two notions that it is vital to hold apart.”346  
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 344 Id.  On this point, see Fuller’s apparent response in Human Purpose and Natural Law, writ-
ten shortly after Discretion, where he discussed questions like, “What is Art?”  Fuller, supra note 
329, at 704.  “It is said,” Fuller wrote, that phrasing questions in that way,  
invites a confusion of fact and value and serves generally as a cover for a fraudulent in-
tent to pass off the subjective opinion of the author about what art ought to be for a de-
scription of what it is in fact, — as if it were possible to describe a major area of human 
striving without participation in that striving and as if that participation could be oth-
erwise than creative!   
Id.   
 345 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, supra note 37, at 612.  
 346 H. L. A. Hart, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1965) (reviewing LON L. 
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964)). 
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Poisoning is a purposive activity, Hart famously observed (presumably, 
one any young hostess should avoid, unless, in her discretion, desperate 
times call for desperate measures), but the principles guiding good poi-
soning are not moral principles in any sense of the word; they are 
merely principles of efficacy.347 
Hart did not make much headway with Fuller on the limits of pur-
pose’s role in legal theory.  Fuller remained obsessed with purpose — 
and the association between purpose and morality — his whole career.  
This difference became something of a sticking point between the two 
men, one they were not shy to joke about in later years.  The jokes, 
however, only reiterated the basic difference: Hart believed purpose is 
relevant, but only to a point.  In his review of Fuller’s book The Mo-
rality of Law, Hart wrote: 
The author has all his life been in love with the notion of purpose and this 
passion, like any other, can both inspire and blind a man. . . . The inspira-
tion is so considerable that I would not wish him to terminate his 
longstanding union with this idée maîtresse.  But I wish that the high ro-
mance would settle down to some cooler form of regard.  When this hap-
pens, the author’s many readers will feel the drop in temperature; but they 
will be amply compensated by an increase in light.348 
The remark amused Fuller, who wrote privately to Hart: 
All I can say of Miss Purpose is that the Old Girl still looks good to me.  
One of her enduring charms is that she is a very complex creature indeed, 
subject to unpredictable moods of surrender and withdrawal.  I believe 
deeply in her without pretending that I really understand her.  So the high 
romance of which you complain will probably continue despite your 
thoughtful warning that our liaison promises trouble.349 
C.  The Right Answers Thesis: Discretion  
and the Hart-Dworkin Debate 
For Hart, purposive analysis was an important but ultimately 
somewhat impotent part of legal reasoning, arising in “the sphere 
where arguments in favour of one decision or another may be rational 
without being conclusive.”350  In Discretion, Hart warned against the 
dream that purposive analysis — or any kind of analysis — can re-
solve every confusion, fill every gap, or render indeterminacy itself an 
illusion borne of insufficient judicial insight.  The “recognition of an 
implicit guiding purpose,” he wrote, “may encourage the illusion that 
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 347 Id. 
 348 Id. at 1296; see also id. at 1295–96.  
 349 Letter from Lon L. Fuller, Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., to H. L. A. Hart, Professor 
of Jurisprudence, Univ. of Oxford 1 (Feb. 3, 1965) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, 
Papers of Lon L. Fuller, Box 3, Folder 14).   
 350 Hart, Discretion, supra note 12, at 665.  
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we never reach the point where we have to reconcile conflicting values 
or choose between them without some more ultimate principle to guide 
us,” but it will never conclusively resolve every indeterminate case.351  
Purposes can constrain and guide decisionmaking, to be sure, but ul-
timately cannot provide unique “right answers” every time. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, a comprehensive “right answers thesis” 
emerged in the work of Dworkin.352  Dworkin argued that unique 
right answers exist for every legal question, and that those answers are 
accessible to judges who fully and rightly weigh all relevant considera-
tions — considerations extending all the way to the deepest moral and 
political foundations of the legal system.  In the eyes of Dworkin’s 
mighty Judge Hercules, the ideal jurist capable of taking everything 
into consideration, there is no indeterminacy; in our mortal eyes, there-
fore, indeterminacy is an illusion.  In areas of perceived indeterminacy, 
Dworkin argued that judges should select the decision that fits best 
with the legal system as a whole — with its rules, precedents, and 
principles, and with the underlying moral and political values that 
make the legal order coherent.  There will, he maintained, be exactly 
one such decision.353 
Dworkin’s theory contrasted with Hart’s at almost every level.354  
Dworkin insisted on the integration of law and morality and denied 
the necessity of legal indeterminacy, claiming that “right answers” 
emerge from the fusion of fact and value.  Late in his life, Hart would 
identify the right answers thesis as the “sharpest direct conflict” be-
tween his work and Dworkin’s — a dispute “aris[ing] from my conten-
tion that in any legal system there will always be certain legally un-
regulated cases” where the law is “partly indeterminate or 
incomplete.”355  Throughout the 1980s, Hart grew anxious about the 
consequences of Dworkin’s theories and struggled to articulate a re-
ply.356  When Hart did respond in the (posthumously published) “Post-
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script” to The Concept of Law, he returned to positions he first pro-
posed in Discretion.357 
The “Postscript” rejected the right answers thesis and asserted the 
necessary role discretion plays in the legal system.  In “legally unregu-
lated” cases, Hart wrote, the judge “must exercise his discretion and 
make law.”358  Hart put special emphasis on the word “discretion” with 
italics, but did not say anything more about what discretion is or how 
it fits into a more comprehensive view of the law.  This part of the 
“Postscript,” seen this way, was an abridged restatement of the Discre-
tion paper; the “Postscript” relied on the same ideas but set them out 
in much less detail.  In Discretion, Hart unambiguously rejected what 
would become Dworkin’s position on judicial reasoning, arguing that 
indeterminacy is inherent and that discretion, and therefore adjudica-
tion in hard cases, “necessarily” requires a “leap.”  To Hart, even the 
word “right” was a stranger in a strange land when it came to discre-
tionary decisions; the best one can hope for is “sound” or “wise.”359 
More specifically, Discretion foreshadowed — and rejected — 
Dworkin’s position that indeterminacy can be eliminated — that is, 
proven to be illusory — if legal reasoning integrates the application of 
rules with the interpretation of principles, purposes, and other ab-
stract, value-laden considerations.  In Hart’s illustrations of discre- 
tion — the young hostess’s dinner party, for example — decision-
makers weighed rules, standards, values, principles, and purposes all 
interconnected in the same “grand matrix.”360  In other words, Discre-
tion implicitly rejected the rule-principle distinction.  Faced with a 
“grand matrix” of rules, standards, principles, and purposes, a judge 
must exercise discretion, rooted in and constrained by reason, identify 
the set of norms at all levels of abstraction that are appropriate to the 
resolution of the case, and then make a rational “leap.”361  The “Post-
script,” in direct chronological reply to Dworkin, reiterated this argu-
ment, painting a picture of norms of various kinds existing on the 
same continuum of abstraction and dismissing the implication that 
rules and principles are fundamentally different or that operating in 
tandem they can render indeterminacy an illusion.362 
In truth, Hart’s vision of legal reasoning in the Discretion paper 
was not entirely out of tune with the theory of judicial reasoning in 
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hard cases that Dworkin would adopt.  In a particularly telling re-
mark, Hart wrote that “where discretion is used in the course of judi-
cial determinations in the attempt to apply rules” — in other words, in 
judicial interpretation — “the weight of factors such as consistency 
with other parts of the legal system will be prominent.”363  Hart’s at-
tention to “consistency with other parts of the legal system” is similar 
to Dworkin’s insight that decisions should “fit” with the entirety of the 
law.  Hart, like Dworkin, valued the coherence and internal consisten-
cy of the legal system and believed that judges should deploy their 
craft in pursuit of the law’s integrity.  Hart even said that more ab-
stract considerations deserve “weight” in discretionary decisions — 
Dworkin’s word exactly.364 
But Hart was very clear that no perfect combination of rules and 
principles, properly weighed, would ever render indeterminacy an illu-
sion.  Hart’s judge and Judge Hercules both appeal to principles “de-
serving of rational approval,” and both search for decisions that cohere 
with the integrity of the whole legal system.365  But sooner or later 
they part ways, as Hart’s judge takes the inevitable “leap” and makes 
a rational choice.  Discretion, Hart argued, even “after we have done 
all we can to secure the optimum conditions for its exercise,” is a form 
of choice — choice significantly constrained by reason and institutional 
role, but choice all the same.366 
CONCLUSION: BETWEEN THE NIGHTMARE  
AND THE NOBLE DREAM 
This Essay has attempted to make sense of H. L. A. Hart’s lost es-
say by revisiting H. L. A. Hart’s America — Hart’s complicated rela-
tionship with American legal thought, his close interaction with the 
Legal Process School, and his debates with Fuller and Dworkin.  In 
one sense, Discretion represents a meeting of two worlds, as the tradi-
tion of Hobbes and Hume collided with the tradition of Holmes and 
Hohfeld.  Yet in a deeper sense, Discretion represents a key moment of 
reciprocal influence in the history of ideas, illustrating Hart’s conscious 
effort to apply his philosophical energy to theoretical problems at the 
core of American jurisprudence, as well as the extent of the Process 
School’s influence on his thinking.  In the early 1950s, Hart and the 
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process theorists found themselves on similar intellectual trajectories.  
Both sought a middle road between formalism and realism, and both 
put their faith in reason — a vague yet potentially redemptive ideal — 
as the way forward.  Hart believed that legal officials, facing decisions 
in the sphere of indeterminacy, should exercise a form of 
decisionmaking similar to what the Process School called “reasoned 
elaboration.”  And in line with process thinking, Hart tentatively 
solved the problem of legal indeterminacy by sketching a theory of le-
gal reasoning.  What matters most, though, is what Discretion reveals 
about Hart’s intellectual world in 1956 and the path of the philosophy 
of law since.  The story of the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group  
reveals that H. L. A. Hart and Henry Hart shared a common under-
standing of how choice in law can be constrained, despite their differ-
ing approaches to legal scholarship.  Discretion clarifies the Hart-
Fuller debate by showing that Hart endorsed purposive analysis in  
legal reasoning, while rejecting any purpose- or value-oriented concep-
tion of law itself.  And the essay illuminates Hart’s rejection of the 
right answers thesis, demonstrating that much of his response to 
Dworkin in the “Postscript” had in fact been formulated at Harvard  
in 1956. 
Perhaps the most enduring lesson of Discretion is that the pursuit 
of legal certainty was not in Hart’s blood and never had been.  In 
1977, Hart would observe that American legal thought had always os-
cillated between two equally wrong extremes.  He called them  
“The Nightmare and the Noble Dream.”367  Hart rejected the “Night- 
mare” — the realist story of unconstrained judicial choice that experi-
enced a kind of post-process restoration with the rise of Critical Legal 
Studies — as much as he denied that the “Noble Dream” — the search 
for unique right answers in a field not capable of their production — 
could ever come true.  Hart’s analysis of discretion, charting a middle 
road between the Nightmare and the Noble Dream, arose in the con-
text of the one American jurisprudential movement that resisted the 
temptation of these two peculiar extremes: legal process. 
As Hart saw it, the prospect of perfect legal certainty had be-
witched Dworkin — “the noblest dreamer of them all,” Hart wrote, “if 
he and Shakespeare will permit me to say so”368 — and sent him on an 
inherently unattainable quest to identify criteria for judicial objectivi-
ty.  Hart was not so much bewitched, as bothered and bewildered.  He 
understood the Noble Dream’s appeal to American legal thinkers, who 
“worrie[d]”369 that the discretion of the unelected is fundamentally an-
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tidemocratic.  He realized that the existence of unique right answers in 
law could provide an ironclad justification for judicial review — the 
elusive solution to the “counter-majoritarian difficulty,” the problem 
Alexander Bickel would make famous six years after Hart’s year at 
Harvard.370  But Hart’s project was not to solve the problems of 
American democracy, and as he saw it, philosophy is not the servant of 
politics.  Hart aimed to understand law in the abstract — its structure, 
its coherence, its modes of thought — in the clearest light.  Hart’s un-
dertaking was, from one angle, a more modest project, but for Hart it 
was the most fundamental task of legal philosophy. 
Still, Hart’s Discretion was a product of a certain historical mo-
ment — a moment when Hart came into intense contact with the anx-
ieties of the legal process generation.  In fact, from one perspective, 
Discretion was the closest Hart ever got to formulating his own solu-
tion to Bickel’s problem.  It would be a mistake, however, to put too 
much faith in this reading.  Hart’s was a pre-Brown theory of judicial 
discretion composed in a post-Brown world.  Hart did not attempt to 
state the precise conditions under which courts can rightly overturn 
the commands of electoral majorities; he failed to spell out exactly how 
courts should reconcile values in direct conflict; he did not say enough 
about what “rationality” really means, or the precise way in which it 
constrains decisionmaking; he did not say clearly how limited a role he 
envisioned courts playing in American political life.  As the sun set on 
the legal process paradigm in the 1960s and 1970s, many of the most 
enduring critiques leveled against (Henry) Hart and Sacks could have 
been directed to H. L. A. Hart as well, to his theory of discretion and 
indeed to his account of law as a whole: the non-neutrality of reason, 
the irreconcilability of conflicting values in a pluralistic society, the in-
adequacy of existing institutional settlements to render justice to peo-
ple excluded from the formation of those settlements, the bare legal 
process’s blindness to history, and more. 
But for all that, Discretion was Hart’s answer to America’s obses-
sive fear that discretion and the rule of law are natural antagonists in 
need of some form of theoretical intercession.  As Hart saw it, discre-
tion is deeply implicit in the concept of the rule of law.  It is the possi-
bility of discretion, in contrast to arbitrary whim, that allows our regu-
lation of the future to be lawlike, given our inherent inability to look 
forward in time with perfect clarity.  In sketching a vision for how dis-
cretion can reconcile legal indeterminacy with the rule of law, Discre-
tion represents a significant, distinctive achievement in legal theory.  If 
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Dworkin’s quest was to eliminate discretion, Hart’s quest was to per-
fect it — by improving our understanding of discretionary decision-
making and what enhances its quality, and by demanding that judges 
live up to the rational standards implicit in the concept of discretion 
itself.  If Dworkin saw discretion as an abdication of the judicial re-
sponsibility to reason all the way to the right answer, Hart saw it as 
the first line of defense against a regime of lawless whim.  To Hart, 
discretion and the rule of law were inseparable, in fact rationally con-
joined — and Judge Hercules was less a Noble Dream than a decep-
tive myth.  It is precisely “because we are men, not gods” that discre-
tion makes possible a government of laws, not men. 
 
